Intellectual Property Rights-I — Practical Problem Answers
FILAD model solutions to the problems asked in past KSLU papers (Dec 2017 to Apr 2021), with practice problems for Unit 5
Unit 1 — Introduction and Patents
7 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1A and B file patent applications with provisional specifications on the same date for the same invention. A files his complete specification much earlier than B, both within time. Examine the status of the two applications.
Primary Problem: ‘A’ and ‘B’ filed for patent application with provisional specification on the same date for the same invention. After that ‘A’ filed complete specification much earlier than ‘B’ but both filed within time allowed. Examine the status of patent application filed by both ‘A’ and ‘B’.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2017: Q.9(c) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
A and B filed provisional specifications for the same invention on the same date.
A filed his complete specification earlier than B, and both within the permitted time.
2. Issues Involved
Does the earlier filing of the complete specification give A priority over B?
What is the status of the two applications?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 9, Patents Act, 1970: a provisional specification may be followed by a complete specification within twelve months (extendable by three months); failing which the application is deemed abandoned.
Section 11: the priority date of a claim in a complete specification is the date of filing of the application and of the provisional specification, where the claims are fairly based on it.
Sections 13 and 18: the examiner searches for prior claims; where the invention is claimed in another application, the Controller may require reference to it to be made; Section 25(1)(c) and 64(1)(a): only a claim with an earlier priority date defeats a later one.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
India follows the first-to-file system based on the priority date, which is the date of the (provisional) application, not the date of filing the complete specification.
A and B filed on the same date, so they have the same priority date. Neither has an earlier priority date, and the order in which the complete specifications are filed within the permitted period gives A no preference.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Both applications are valid, and each has the common priority date, because each filed the complete specification within the time allowed under Section 9.
A cannot claim priority because he filed the complete specification earlier: priority runs from the provisional filing date, which is identical.
Since only one valid patent can be granted for the same invention to the true and first inventor, the Controller will examine both, require reference to the other application and decide on the facts who is the true and first inventor.
6. Decision / Conclusion
Both applications are valid and have the same priority date. A gets no priority merely because his complete specification was filed earlier. The Controller will deal with the overlapping claims, and, if both claim the same invention, will determine the true and first inventor before a patent is granted.
Ratio Decidendi: Priority is determined by the date of the first (provisional) application, not by the date of the complete specification; applicants filing on the same date have equal priority.
P2Mr. X invents an antivirus software named ‘Quick Heal’ to protect computer systems and applies for a patent. Advise him.
Primary Problem: Mr. ‘X’ invented an antivirus software namely ‘Quick Heal’ to provide protection to the computer system. He has applied for patent protection for his invention. Advise him.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2018: Q.9(a) — this problem
Jul 2018 / Apr 2021: Q.6 — essay on patenting of software; Q.7(b) short note on copyright in micro-software
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
X invented antivirus software, ‘Quick Heal’, to protect computer systems.
He has applied for a patent.
2. Issues Involved
Is a computer programme patentable under the Patents Act?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 3(k), Patents Act, 1970: a mathematical or business method or a computer programme per se or algorithms is not an invention.
Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions (2017): a software invention that shows a technical effect or technical contribution, or is combined with hardware, is not a ‘computer programme per se’ and may be patented.
Section 2(1)(j): the invention must be new, involve an inventive step and be capable of industrial application.
Section 2(o), Copyright Act, 1957: computer programmes are protected as literary works.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Software as such is excluded, but if it solves a technical problem or has a technical effect it can be patented — Ferid Allani v. Union of India (2019, Delhi HC).
Copyright protects the code (the expression), while a patent protects the technical solution.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Antivirus software detects and removes malicious programs and protects the computer, which is a technical effect on the working of the computer system.
If X claims only a programme as such, the application is likely to be refused under Section 3(k). If he claims the method with its technical effect, and shows novelty and inventive step, it can be allowed.
In any event, X should protect the source code by copyright and the name by trade mark.
6. Decision / Conclusion
X should draft his claims to show the technical effect of the software (how it detects and removes threats on the computer system) and not claim the program per se. On that footing, the patent can be considered under the CRI Guidelines; otherwise Section 3(k) bars it. He should also rely on copyright for the code.
Ratio Decidendi: A computer programme per se is not patentable (Section 3(k)); software showing a technical effect or technical contribution can be.
P3A co-owner of a patented article assigns his share to a third party without the consent of the other co-owner. Decide the validity of the assignment.
Primary Problem: The co-owner of the patented Article assigns his share in it to a third party without the consent of the other co-owner. Decide the validity of the assignment.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Jul 2017: Q.9(b) — this problem
Jul 2019: Q.8(a) — short note: transfer of patent rights
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
A patent is held by two or more co-owners.
One co-owner assigns his share to a third party without the other’s consent.
2. Issues Involved
Can a co-owner of a patent assign his share without the consent of the other co-owner?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 50, Patents Act, 1970: where a patent is granted to two or more persons, each is, unless there is an agreement to the contrary, entitled to an equal undivided share. Subject to any agreement, each co-owner may use the invention for his own benefit without accounting to the others, but a co-owner shall not grant a licence or assign his share without the consent of the other co-owner(s).
Section 68: an assignment must be in writing and registered to be effective.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The restriction in Section 50 protects the co-owners from having a stranger imposed on them, and from dilution of the value of the patent. The consent of every co-owner is a statutory condition for an assignment or licence of a share.
5. Application to the Present Problem
The assignment was made without the other co-owner’s consent, and so did not satisfy the condition in Section 50.
The third party does not acquire rights that bind the other co-owner, unless there is an agreement to the contrary between the co-owners.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The assignment is not valid, since a co-owner cannot assign his share without the consent of the other co-owner (Section 50), unless the co-owners have an agreement permitting it.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 50, a patent co-owner may not assign or license his share without the consent of the other co-owners.
P4An American company holds a patent for a medicine that cures AIDS/HIV, which is not available in India. The Indian Government permits an Indian company to make a generic version without the American company’s consent. Is this infringement?
Primary Problem: An American pharmaceutical company obtains patent for its invention of Medicine which cures AIDS/HIV+. The medicine is not available to the people of India. Indian Government gives permission to the Indian pharmaceutical company to produce generic version of the same invention without the consent of American company. Whether there is any infringement of the patent by Indian company? Give reasons.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Jul 2018: Q.9(b) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
A foreign company holds an Indian patent for an AIDS/HIV medicine.
The medicine is not available to people in India.
The Government allows an Indian company to produce a generic version without the patentee’s consent.
2. Issues Involved
Is production by the Indian company under Government permission an infringement?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 84, Patents Act, 1970: compulsory licence on application after three years, where the reasonable requirements of the public are not satisfied, the invention is not available at a reasonably affordable price, or it is not worked in India.
Section 92: where the Central Government is satisfied of a national emergency, extreme urgency or public non-commercial use, it may notify it, and the Controller grants a compulsory licence.
Sections 99–103: use of inventions for the purposes of Government; Section 47(4): the patent is granted subject to the condition that the Government may import or make the invention for its own use.
TRIPS Article 31 and the Doha Declaration (2001): permit compulsory licensing to protect public health.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The patentee’s monopoly is not absolute; the Act balances it against public interest, especially public health. Production under a compulsory licence or for Government use is authorised by statute and is not infringement — see Bayer Corporation v. Union of India (2014, Bombay HC) on India’s first compulsory licence (Nexavar).
5. Application to the Present Problem
The medicine is not available to the Indian public, and AIDS is a serious public health problem, so grounds under Sections 84 and 92 (and Government use under Section 100) are made out.
The Indian company is acting under the authority of the State and the statute, and not as an ordinary infringer.
The patentee is entitled to reasonable royalty or compensation, but cannot treat the production as infringement.
6. Decision / Conclusion
There is no infringement, provided the permission is given in accordance with the Patents Act, through a compulsory licence (Sections 84 or 92) or Government use (Chapter XVII). The patentee is entitled only to a reasonable royalty fixed by the Controller.
Ratio Decidendi: Production under a compulsory licence or for Government use authorised by the Patents Act is not infringement; the patentee gets a royalty.
P5Tech-illa claims a machine which, if used as directed, can make a pebble hang in the air 50 feet above the earth’s surface. Can the Controller grant him a patent?
Primary Problem: Tech-illa, a maverick, claims he has invented a machine that, if used as directed, can enable a pebble to be suspended in the air at a height of 50 feet above the earth’s surface. Can the controller consider this claim for granting a patent?
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Jul 2019: Q.9(b) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Tech-illa claims a machine that suspends a pebble in the air 50 feet above the ground.
2. Issues Involved
Is the claim a patentable ‘invention’, or is it excluded by Section 3?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 2(1)(j): an invention must be a new product or process involving an inventive step and capable of industrial application.
Section 3(a): an invention which is frivolous or which claims anything obviously contrary to well established natural laws is not an invention within the meaning of the Act.
Section 15: the Controller may refuse an application which does not comply with the Act.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
A claim that defies established laws of nature, such as gravity, without a demonstrated and credible mechanism, is treated as frivolous or non-enabling, and cannot be patented.
The invention must be capable of industrial application, meaning that it can actually be made or used, and the specification must enable a skilled person to do so.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Suspending a pebble in mid-air at 50 feet, with no stated support or force, appears contrary to the established law of gravitation.
The claim is in the nature of a perpetual-motion or levitation claim, and unless Tech-illa can show a plausible and working mechanism (for example, a known force like magnetism), it is frivolous.
The Controller can refuse the claim under Section 3(a), and also for lack of industrial applicability.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The Controller can refuse the claim under Section 3(a) as being contrary to well-established natural laws (and as not capable of industrial application), unless Tech-illa demonstrates a genuine, working and scientifically explained mechanism.
Ratio Decidendi: Claims obviously contrary to well-established natural laws are not inventions and are refused under Section 3(a).
P6Anand obtains an Indian patent for a gene therapy invention. Six months later Maggie, a US citizen, says she obtained a US patent on the same invention two years before the grant to Anand, and wants his patent revoked. Can she succeed?
Primary Problem: Anand successfully claims and obtains a patent in India for his invention in the field of gene therapy. Around six months subsequent to the same, Maggie, a U.S. citizen, contends that she has acquired a U.S. patent on the same invention two years prior to the grant of patent to Anand. She wants Anand’s patent to be revoked. Can she succeed?
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Jul 2019: Q.9(c) — this problem
Jul 2019: Q.7 — essay: grounds for revocation of a patent
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Anand holds an Indian patent for a gene therapy invention.
Maggie claims a US patent on the same invention, granted two years before the grant to Anand.
She seeks revocation of Anand’s Indian patent.
2. Issues Involved
Is an earlier foreign patent a ground for revocation of an Indian patent?
What procedure can Maggie use?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 64(1), Patents Act, 1970: a patent may be revoked on a petition by any person interested on grounds including that the invention was not new having regard to what was publicly known or used in India before the priority date, or published in India or elsewhere in any document before that date (clause (e)); lack of inventive step; and that it is not an invention (clause (d)).
Section 25(2): post-grant opposition within one year from the publication of the grant, by any person interested.
Section 3(i): any process for the medicinal, surgical or curative treatment of human beings is not an invention.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Patents are territorial. A US patent does not, by itself, invalidate an Indian patent. But the publication of the US patent anywhere in the world, before the priority date of Anand’s application, destroys novelty.
What counts is the date of Anand’s priority (filing) date, not the date of grant. The US patent being granted two years before the Indian grant is not enough, because the Indian filing date may be earlier.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Maggie must show that her US patent (or its publication) was published before Anand’s priority date, and that it discloses the same invention. If so, Anand’s invention is not new, and the Indian patent is liable to be revoked under Section 64(1).
If Anand’s Indian application was filed earlier than the US publication, the US patent is no prior art, and Maggie’s claim fails.
She may file a post-grant opposition under Section 25(2) (within one year of publication of grant, which is available as the grant was six months ago) or a revocation petition before the High Court under Section 64.
6. Decision / Conclusion
Maggie can succeed only if her US patent was published before Anand’s priority date and discloses the same invention, since that destroys novelty. The mere fact that her patent was granted earlier than Anand’s Indian grant is not enough. She should file a post-grant opposition under Section 25(2) or a revocation petition under Section 64.
Ratio Decidendi: An earlier publication anywhere in the world, before the priority date, anticipates an invention and is a ground for revocation; the date of grant is irrelevant.
P7A petitioner challenges Section 126 of the Patents Act as unconstitutional under Article 19(1)(g), because it does not permit advocates to practise before the Patent Office. Decide.
Primary Problem: A petitioner challenges Section 126 of Patent Act as unconstitutional on the ground that it goes against Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India as the said Section does not permit advocates to carry-out patent practice. Decide.
Section 126 prescribes the qualifications for registration as a patent agent.
An advocate challenges it, saying that it denies advocates the right to do patent practice, violating Article 19(1)(g).
2. Issues Involved
Is a qualification requirement for patent agents a reasonable restriction on the right to practise a profession?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Article 19(1)(g): all citizens have the right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
Article 19(6): the State may impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public, including the prescription of professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession.
Section 126, Patents Act, 1970: a person is qualified to be registered as a patent agent if he is an Indian citizen, has completed 21 years, holds a degree in science, engineering or technology, and has passed the qualifying examination.
Section 30, Advocates Act, 1961: the general right of advocates to practise, subject to the provisions of the Act.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The right to practise a profession is subject to reasonable restrictions, including the prescription of qualifications. A restriction is reasonable if it has a rational connection with the object, and is not excessive — Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P. (AIR 1951 SC 118).
A special statute, the Patents Act, prevails over the general Advocates Act in its own field.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Preparing and prosecuting patent applications requires scientific and technical knowledge, which a law degree does not provide.
A qualification requirement of a degree in science or engineering, with a qualifying exam, is a reasonable restriction in the interests of those who seek patent services.
Advocates are not barred from the litigation side, such as appearing in court in infringement or revocation matters, and may become patent agents if they have the technical qualification.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The challenge is likely to fail. Section 126 is a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6), because it prescribes technical qualifications for patent practice, and it does not violate Article 19(1)(g).
Ratio Decidendi: Prescribing technical qualifications for a specialised profession is a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6).
Unit 2 — Trade Marks
6 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1The plaintiff holds the trade mark ‘DON’. The defendant begins to use the mark ‘DAWN’. The plaintiff challenges it. Decide.
Primary Problem: The Plaintiff holds trademark on ‘DON’. The defendant begins to use trade mark as ‘DAWN’. The Plaintiff challenges it. Decide.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2018: Q.9(b) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
The plaintiff has a registered mark ‘DON’.
The defendant uses ‘DAWN’, and the plaintiff challenges it.
2. Issues Involved
Is ‘DAWN’ deceptively similar to ‘DON’, so as to infringe the registered mark?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 2(1)(h): deceptively similar — so nearly resembling another mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
Section 29(2)(b): infringement where, because of similarity of the marks and identity or similarity of goods, there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public.
Section 135: reliefs of injunction, damages or account of profits.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Similarity is judged from the standpoint of a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, by looking at the marks as a whole. Phonetic similarity is of great importance, since goods are often asked for by name — Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta (1962); Cadila Healthcare v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals (2001).
Marks are compared visually, phonetically and in meaning.
5. Application to the Present Problem
‘DON’ and ‘DAWN’ are phonetically very close, differing in only one vowel sound, and so are likely to be confused when spoken.
If the goods are the same or similar, an ordinary buyer is likely to think the goods come from the same source.
Differences in meaning (a leader versus daybreak) are less significant than the phonetic similarity.
6. Decision / Conclusion
‘DAWN’ is deceptively similar to ‘DON’. If the goods are the same or similar, the use of ‘DAWN’ is an infringement, and the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction and damages or account of profits.
Ratio Decidendi: Phonetic similarity of marks used for similar goods is enough for deceptive similarity and infringement.
P2X, the proprietor of a registered trade mark, sues Z for infringement 15 years after the infringement began. Is there any irregularity in the suit?
Primary Problem: ‘X’ a proprietor of a registered Trademark brings a suit against ‘Z’ for infringement after 15 years of such infringement. Is there any irregularity in the suit? Comment.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2018: Q.9(c) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
X is the proprietor of a registered trade mark.
He sues Z for infringement 15 years after the infringement began.
2. Issues Involved
Is the suit barred by limitation, or by delay or acquiescence?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 22, Limitation Act, 1963: in the case of a continuing wrong, a fresh period of limitation begins at every moment during which the wrong continues.
Section 33, Trade Marks Act, 1999: where the proprietor of an earlier mark has acquiesced for a continuous period of five years in the use of a registered mark, being aware of the use, he cannot oppose its use or seek to invalidate it, unless the registration was not in good faith.
Section 135, T.M. Act: relief in an infringement suit.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Infringement of a trade mark is a continuing wrong, so a suit is not barred by limitation merely because the first infringement occurred many years ago.
But long delay may amount to acquiescence or laches, which can disentitle the plaintiff to an injunction, and damages may be limited to the period within the limitation — Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines (1994) 2 SCC 448; Ramdev Food Products v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel (2006) 8 SCC 726.
5. Application to the Present Problem
The suit is not time-barred merely because 15 years have passed, because every act of infringement gives a fresh cause of action.
However, the plaintiff did nothing for 15 years while Z was using the mark openly. If X knew of the use, this may amount to acquiescence, which will bar the grant of an injunction (and the five-year rule in Section 33 applies to certain claims).
Damages or profits would be limited to the period of three years before the suit.
6. Decision / Conclusion
There is no irregularity in point of limitation, as infringement is a continuing wrong. But the delay of 15 years may amount to acquiescence or laches, so that X may be refused an injunction, and any monetary relief is limited to the period within limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: Trade mark infringement is a continuing wrong, so a suit is not time-barred; but long delay can amount to acquiescence and bar injunctive relief.
P3Sahana Trading Company holds the mark ‘Lakme’ for cosmetics. Lehar Trading Company uses the mark ‘Like-me’ for cosmetics. Sahana challenges it as infringing. Decide.
Primary Problem: Sahana Trading Company and Lehar Trading Company are engaged in manufacturing of cosmetic products. Sahana Trading Co. holds trade mark on its product as ‘Lakme’, but Lehar Trading Co. holds trade mark on its product as ‘Like-me’. Sahana Trading Company challenges against the use of trade mark, ‘Like-me’ by the Lehar Trading Company on the ground that it infringes its trade-mark, ‘Lakme’. Decide.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Jul 2017: Q.9(a) — this problem
Jul 2017: Q.8(c) — short note: deceptive similarity
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Both companies make cosmetics.
Sahana’s mark is ‘Lakme’ and Lehar’s mark is ‘Like-me’.
2. Issues Involved
Is ‘Like-me’ deceptively similar to ‘Lakme’ for identical goods?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 29(2), Trade Marks Act, 1999: infringement where, because of the similarity of marks and goods, there is likelihood of confusion; Section 29(3): the Court presumes confusion where the marks are identical and the goods identical.
Section 2(1)(h): deceptive similarity.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Marks are compared as a whole and by the sound as spoken. A mark that sounds nearly identical, for the same class of goods, is likely to deceive a purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect recollection — Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta (1962); Parle Products v. J.P. & Co. (1972).
Cosmetics are consumer goods bought by quick selection, so the risk of confusion on phonetic similarity is high.
5. Application to the Present Problem
‘Lakme’ is pronounced “Lak-may” and ‘Like-me’ “Like-me”, which sound very similar.
Both marks are used for the same goods, cosmetics, and sold to the same class of buyers.
A purchaser with imperfect recollection could easily mistake ‘Like-me’ for ‘Lakme’, and so the likelihood of confusion exists.
6. Decision / Conclusion
‘Like-me’ is deceptively similar to ‘Lakme’, and its use for cosmetics infringes Sahana’s registered mark. Sahana is entitled to an injunction and to damages or an account of profits.
Ratio Decidendi: Marks which are phonetically near-identical, for the same goods, are deceptively similar and infringing.
P4The plaintiff’s mark ‘SURYA’ is a sun device in a half circle with alternate long and short radiating lines; the defendant’s device is a stylised ‘SUN’ with flames, eyes, nose and mouth. Can an injunction be granted against the defendant?
Primary Problem: The trade mark of the plaintiff is ‘SURYA’ consisted of the sun device in a half circle with lines radically projecting out of its circumferences, alternate line being long and alternate line being short, on the other hand the defendants device comprised of very stylized representation by ‘SUN’ which has flames around it with eyes, nose and mouth whether injunction order can be given on the defendants use of trade mark. Decide.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Jul 2018: Q.9(a) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
The plaintiff’s mark is the word ‘SURYA’ with a sun device in a half circle with alternating long and short rays.
The defendant’s device is a stylised sun with flames, eyes, nose and mouth, along with the word ‘SUN’.
2. Issues Involved
Is the defendant’s composite mark deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s mark, so as to justify an injunction?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 2(1)(h) and Section 29(2): similarity and likelihood of confusion, including association with the registered mark.
Section 17: the rights of the proprietor of a composite mark, subject to the distinctive elements.
Section 135(1): reliefs including interlocutory injunction.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The Court compares the marks as a whole and takes the overall impression on a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, and not by dissecting points of difference — Parle Products v. J.P. & Co. (1972).
Similarity of idea may be enough: ‘Surya’ is the Hindi word for ‘sun’, and a sun device conveys the same idea in either mark. But where the visual get-up is clearly different, the Court may refuse an injunction at the interim stage.
5. Application to the Present Problem
The word marks ‘SURYA’ and ‘SUN’ are different in sound, but they are translations of each other, and both marks carry the idea of the sun.
The plaintiff’s device is a plain half-sun with rays, while the defendant’s is a stylised sun with a human face and flames, which is visually distinctive.
The question depends on the class of goods and buyers: for goods sold to unlettered or hurried buyers, the shared idea of the sun may cause confusion; for others, the distinct get-up reduces it.
6. Decision / Conclusion
An injunction can be granted if the Court finds that the overall impression, including the identical idea of the sun and the identical goods, is likely to deceive ordinary purchasers. If the visual differences, the face and flames, are found to be dominant, the Court may refuse the injunction at the interim stage and leave the matter for trial. On the facts given, the plaintiff has a fair case for interim relief.
Ratio Decidendi: Marks are compared as a whole; similarity of idea (a translation) combined with similar get-up may be enough for infringement, but a clearly different visual get-up may defeat an interim injunction.
P5P has the trade mark ‘Specter’ on branded contact lenses. D wants to use the same mark for surgical tables. Can D obtain registration?
Primary Problem: ‘P’ has a trademark ‘Specter’ on branded contact lens. ‘D’ wants to use the same for surgical tables. Decide if ‘D’ could succeed in obtaining registration.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Jul 2019: Q.9(a) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
P owns the mark ‘Specter’ for branded contact lenses.
D wants to register and use ‘Specter’ for surgical tables.
2. Issues Involved
Is registration of the identical mark for different goods barred?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 11(1), Trade Marks Act, 1999: a mark shall not be registered if, because of its identity with or similarity to an earlier mark and the identity or similarity of the goods, there exists a likelihood of confusion.
Section 11(2): a mark which is identical or similar to an earlier mark shall not be registered for goods which are not similar, where the earlier mark is a well-known mark in India and the use would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, its distinctive character or repute.
Section 11(6)–(9): how a well-known mark is determined.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Protection of a mark is, as a rule, limited to the goods for which it is registered and to similar goods. For dissimilar goods, protection is available only if the earlier mark has a reputation (is well known) and there is a likelihood of dilution or unfair advantage — Daimler Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Hybo Hindustan (1994, Delhi HC).
The nature of the goods, trade channels and class of customers determine whether the goods are similar.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Contact lenses and surgical tables are different goods, used by different persons (consumers versus hospitals), and sold through different channels.
There is likely to be little confusion on that account, so Section 11(1) is not attracted.
P can oppose registration only under Section 11(2), if ‘Specter’ is a well-known mark in India and use for surgical tables would take unfair advantage or harm its repute. The problem says only ‘branded’, which does not itself show a well-known status.
6. Decision / Conclusion
D can ordinarily succeed in obtaining registration for surgical tables, as the goods are dissimilar. D will be refused only if P establishes that ‘Specter’ is a well-known mark in India and use for surgical tables would take unfair advantage of or damage its reputation (Section 11(2)).
Ratio Decidendi: Protection for dissimilar goods requires proof that the earlier mark is well known and that use on the other goods is likely to take unfair advantage or cause dilution (Section 11(2)).
P6A company assigns its trade mark ‘MAAZA’ to the plaintiff company with all IP rights and goodwill in India for mango fruit drinks. The assignor then starts exporting fruit drinks under ‘MAAZA’ to Turkey. The plaintiff sues. Decide.
Primary Problem: The defendant company assigns its trade mark ‘MAAZA’ to the plaintiff company with all intellectual property rights and its goodwill in India concerning mango fruit drink. Afterwards the defendant company starts exporting fruit drink under the name of ‘MAAZA’ to Turkey. The plaintiff company seeks legal action against the defendant company. Decide.
The defendant assigned its mark ‘MAAZA’ to the plaintiff, with all IP rights and goodwill in India.
The defendant then began exporting a fruit drink under ‘MAAZA’ to Turkey.
2. Issues Involved
Does the assignee’s right in India include the right to stop the assignor’s export of goods under the mark from India?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Sections 37–42, Trade Marks Act, 1999: assignment and transmission of trade marks; an assignment transfers the assignor’s rights in the mark.
Section 56: the application of a trade mark to goods or in relation to goods for export from India is deemed to be use of the mark in India.
Sections 28–29: the registered proprietor has the exclusive right to use the mark and may sue for infringement by use without consent.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Trade mark rights are territorial, but under Section 56, the use of a mark on goods for export from India is use in India. An assignor who has transferred all rights in India cannot, after the assignment, use the same mark on goods produced and exported from India, which would infringe the assignee’s rights — The Coca-Cola Company v. Bisleri International Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi HC, 2009) on the ‘MAAZA’ mark.
5. Application to the Present Problem
The plaintiff is now the proprietor of ‘MAAZA’ in India, including the goodwill, and the defendant has no right left in India.
The defendant’s manufacture and export from India of drinks under ‘MAAZA’ is deemed use in India (Section 56), and is without the plaintiff’s consent.
Whatever rights the defendant retains outside India, it cannot use the mark on goods made and sold for export from India.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The plaintiff will succeed. The defendant’s use of ‘MAAZA’ on goods exported from India is use in India under Section 56, and infringes the plaintiff’s rights as the assignee. The plaintiff is entitled to an injunction restraining the defendant from manufacturing and exporting under that mark from India.
Ratio Decidendi: An assignor who has assigned all rights in a mark in India cannot use it on goods exported from India, because use for export is use in India (Section 56).
Unit 3 — Cyber Intellectual Property
3 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1X sends false information by e-mail to his friend Y to cause annoyance. Has X committed any offence under the Information Technology Act?
Primary Problem: ‘X’ sends false information through E-mail to his friend, ‘Y’ to cause annoyance. Has X Committed any offence under Information Technology Act? Decide.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2017: Q.9(a) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
X sends an e-mail containing false information to his friend Y, with the purpose of causing annoyance.
2. Issues Involved
Is sending false information by e-mail to cause annoyance an offence under the IT Act?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 66A, IT Act, 2000 (inserted in 2008): punished sending, by means of a computer resource or communication device, any information which the sender knows to be false, for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, with imprisonment up to three years and fine.
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1: the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A in its entirety as violative of Article 19(1)(a), for vagueness and overbreadth.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
When the problem was set (2017), the question was whether Section 66A applied, and the answer was yes, because the e-mail contained false information sent to cause annoyance. But Section 66A was declared unconstitutional and void in 2015, and the offence no longer exists.
Mere annoyance is not a ground on which speech can be penalised under Article 19(2).
5. Application to the Present Problem
The act of X would formerly have fallen within Section 66A(c), as a false message sent to annoy.
Since Section 66A has been struck down, X has not committed any offence under the IT Act merely by sending false information to annoy.
Whether X has committed an offence under other laws depends on what the message contains: for example, defamation, criminal intimidation or cheating under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
6. Decision / Conclusion
X has not committed an offence under the IT Act, as Section 66A, which would have covered his act, was struck down in Shreya Singhal (2015). He may be liable under other laws only if the content of the message makes out some other offence.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 66A, which punished false messages sent to cause annoyance, has been struck down; sending such a message is not by itself an offence under the IT Act.
P2X obtains a digital signature certificate by concealing material facts. The Certifying Authority revokes the certificate without giving X a hearing. X challenges it. Decide.
Primary Problem: ‘X’ obtains digital signature certificate from the certifying authority. But it is found there after that ‘X’ has obtained it concealing material facts. The certifying authority revokes the digital signature certificate of ‘X’ without giving him an opportunity of hearing. ‘X’ challenges it. Decide.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Jul 2017: Q.9(c) — this problem
Jul 2017: Q.5 — essay: Certifying Authority and functions of the Controller
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
X obtained a digital signature certificate by concealing material facts.
The Certifying Authority revoked it without hearing X.
X challenges the revocation.
2. Issues Involved
Can a Certifying Authority revoke a certificate without giving the subscriber a hearing?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 38(2), IT Act, 2000: a Certifying Authority may revoke a digital (electronic) signature certificate if it is satisfied that a material fact represented in the certificate is false or has been concealed, or that a requirement for issuance was not satisfied.
Section 38(3): the Certifying Authority shall not revoke a certificate unless the subscriber has been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter.
Section 71: misrepresentation to the Controller or Certifying Authority is punishable.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The principles of natural justice require that no one be condemned unheard, and an order affecting a person’s rights is invalid if made without notice and hearing — A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
Here the statute itself, in Section 38(3), makes a hearing mandatory before revocation.
5. Application to the Present Problem
X did conceal material facts, which is a statutory ground for revocation under Section 38(2).
However, the Certifying Authority did not give X the hearing that Section 38(3) requires, and so its order is procedurally invalid.
The defect can be cured by giving X notice and a hearing, after which the Authority may revoke the certificate if the concealment is established.
6. Decision / Conclusion
X’s challenge succeeds on the ground of procedure: the revocation without a hearing violates Section 38(3) and natural justice, and is liable to be set aside. The Certifying Authority may, however, issue notice, hear X and revoke afresh, as concealment of material facts is a valid ground. X may also be liable for misrepresentation (Section 71).
Ratio Decidendi: A Certifying Authority cannot revoke a certificate without giving the subscriber an opportunity of being heard (Section 38(3)), even where concealment of facts is a valid ground.
P3A posts the works of six well-known Indian novelists on his website without permission. The novelists want to sue for copyright infringement under the Information Technology Act. Discuss the relevant provisions.
Primary Problem: Mr. ‘A’ has posted in his website the works of six well known Indian Novelists without their permission. The novelists intend to sue for infringement of copyright against Mr. ‘A’ under Information Technology Act, 2000 — Discuss the relevant provisions.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Jul 2018: Q.9(c) — this problem
Jul 2018 / Apr 2021: Q.6, Q.7(b) — essay on software copyright; short note on copyright in micro-software
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
A put the works of six novelists on his website without permission.
The novelists want to sue for copyright infringement under the IT Act.
2. Issues Involved
Does the IT Act provide a remedy for copyright infringement, or must the novelists sue under the Copyright Act?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Proviso to Section 81, IT Act, 2000: nothing in the Act restricts any person from exercising any right conferred under the Copyright Act, 1957 or the Patents Act, 1970.
Section 51, Copyright Act, 1957: copyright is infringed when a person, without a licence, does anything which only the owner can do, including communicating the work to the public; Section 14: the exclusive rights of the owner, including reproduction and communication to the public.
Sections 55 and 63: civil remedies (injunction, damages, account of profits) and criminal penalties (imprisonment of six months to three years and fine of Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 2 lakh).
Section 79, IT Act: limited safe harbour for intermediaries, which does not protect a person who himself puts up infringing content.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The IT Act has no provision which creates or punishes copyright infringement as such, and the proviso to Section 81 preserves the copyright owner’s rights under the Copyright Act. The remedy for infringement of literary works on a website is therefore under the Copyright Act.
A website owner who himself uploads copyrighted work without permission is the primary infringer; a mere intermediary can be liable if it has actual knowledge — see Super Cassettes Industries Ltd v. MySpace Inc. (Delhi HC).
5. Application to the Present Problem
The novels are literary works, protected under the Copyright Act, and communicating them to the public by posting them on a website is an act reserved to the owners (Section 14).
A has no licence, so his uploading is infringement under Section 51.
The novelists should sue under the Copyright Act, claiming an injunction and takedown, damages or account of profits, and may also prosecute under Section 63. The IT Act’s role is limited, for example in blocking or takedown of content and in the intermediary provisions.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The novelists cannot base their suit on the IT Act, which does not deal with copyright infringement. Under the proviso to Section 81, their remedy is under the Copyright Act, 1957 (Sections 51, 55 and 63): injunction, damages or account of profits, and criminal prosecution of A.
Ratio Decidendi: The IT Act does not create copyright remedies and saves rights under the Copyright Act (Section 81 proviso); infringement on a website is actionable under the Copyright Act.
Unit 4 — Geographical Indications
2 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1Ramesh, an authorised user of a registered geographical indication, dies. On whom does his right devolve?
Primary Problem: Ramesh who is an authorized user holding a right in a registered geographical indication dies. On whom does his right devolve?
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2017: Q.9(b) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Ramesh was a registered authorised user of a registered geographical indication.
He died.
2. Issues Involved
Can the right of an authorised user pass to his heirs on death, despite the rule against transmission?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 24(1), Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999: the right to a registered GI is not the subject matter of assignment, transmission, licensing, pledge or mortgage.
Section 24(2): on the death of an authorised user, his right in the registered GI shall devolve on his successor in title.
Section 17: registration of authorised users in Part B of the Register.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
A registered GI is a collective right of the producers of the region, and cannot be sold or licensed. The one exception is devolution on the death of an authorised user, so that his family business can continue with the right.
The successor must himself belong to the class of producers and apply to the Registrar for registration as an authorised user.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Ramesh’s right as an authorised user cannot be assigned or licensed by him during his life.
On his death, the right passes by operation of law to his successor in title (for example, his legal heir carrying on the production), under Section 24(2).
The successor should apply to the Registrar to be registered as an authorised user.
6. Decision / Conclusion
Ramesh’s right devolves on his successor in title under Section 24(2) of the GI Act, notwithstanding the general bar on transmission. The successor should inform the Registrar and seek registration as an authorised user.
Ratio Decidendi: A GI right cannot be assigned or licensed, but on the death of an authorised user it devolves on his successor in title (Section 24).
P2A petitioner challenges the GI granted for ‘Tirupati Laddus’ to the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam, a single entity, saying that it neglects the community interest of others in Tirupati and prejudices Article 25. Decide.
Primary Problem: The petitioner challenges the grant of Geographical Indication to ‘Tirupati Laddus’ to Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam, a single entity neglecting community interest of other people living in Tirupati and further causing prejudice to Article 25 of the Constitution of India. Decide.
A GI was registered for ‘Tirupati Laddus’ in favour of the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam (TTD).
The petitioner says that this neglects the interest of other people in Tirupati and prejudices Article 25.
2. Issues Involved
Can a GI be registered in favour of a single authority such as the TTD?
Does it violate Article 25 (freedom of religion)?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 11, GI Act, 1999: an application for registration may be made by any association of persons or producers, or any organisation or authority established by or under any law for the time being in force, representing the interest of the producers of the goods concerned.
Sections 17 and 21: other producers of the goods can be registered as authorised users, and then share the right to use the GI.
Article 25, Constitution: freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality and health.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
A GI is a collective right; it is registered through a representative body, but the benefits go to all producers of that good in that territory who are registered as authorised users.
A GI protects the name of a product against misuse. It does not regulate religious worship or practice, and does not restrict a devotee’s freedom under Article 25.
5. Application to the Present Problem
The TTD is a statutory body (established by and under law) which prepares and distributes the laddus, and so it is an ‘authority’ which can apply under Section 11.
The registration in the name of the TTD does not shut out other producers: other producers, if any, can be registered as authorised users, so that community interest is accommodated.
The GI protects the name ‘Tirupati Laddu’ from being used on goods not made by the authorised producers, and has nothing to do with religious freedom; there is no restriction on devotees’ religious practices, and so Article 25 is not attracted.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The challenge is likely to fail. The TTD, as an authority established by law, can apply under Section 11, other producers may seek registration as authorised users, and the GI does not interfere with any right under Article 25.
Ratio Decidendi: A GI may be registered in favour of an authority established by law representing the producers; it protects the product name and does not affect religious freedom under Article 25.
Unit 5 — International Conventions and Treaties
3 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1A files a patent application in Japan on 1 March 2025 and an application in India for the same invention on 20 February 2026. Can he claim 1 March 2025 as the priority date? Would the answer be the same for a trade mark?
Primary Problem: ‘A’ files a patent application for an invention in Japan (a Paris Convention country) on 1 March 2025. He files an application in India for the same invention on 20 February 2026. Can he claim 1 March 2025 as the priority date in India? Would the position be the same if the first application were for a trade mark?
📝 Practice problem — framed from topics asked in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2017 / Dec 2018 / Jul 2017: Q.7 / Q.6 / Q.7 — essays on the Paris Convention
A’s first patent application was filed in Japan on 1 March 2025.
He filed in India on 20 February 2026, within 12 months.
The question extends to a trade mark.
2. Issues Involved
What is the period of priority under the Paris Convention for patents and for trade marks?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Article 4, Paris Convention, 1883: a person who has duly filed an application in one member country enjoys a right of priority for filing in other member countries within 12 months for patents and utility models, and 6 months for industrial designs and trade marks.
Sections 135–137, Patents Act, 1970 (Convention applications) and Section 154, Trade Marks Act, 1999: give effect to the right of priority in India.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The later application is treated as if it had been filed on the date of the first application, so that intervening acts, such as publications or third-party filings, do not defeat it.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Japan is a member of the Paris Convention, and the Indian application was filed on 20 February 2026, within 12 months of 1 March 2025 (the last day being 1 March 2026).
For a trade mark the period would be 6 months, ending on 1 September 2025, so an Indian application on 20 February 2026 would be outside it.
6. Decision / Conclusion
For the patent, A can claim 1 March 2025 as the priority date, as he filed in India within 12 months. For a trade mark, the position is different: the priority period is only 6 months, so A could not claim priority.
Ratio Decidendi: Paris priority is 12 months for patents and 6 months for trade marks and designs, counted from the first filing in a member country (Article 4).
P2An applicant files a PCT international application with a priority date of 10 January 2025. He wants to enter the Indian national phase on 20 August 2027. Is he in time?
Primary Problem: An applicant files an international application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, claiming a priority date of 10 January 2025 and designating India. He wants to enter the national phase in India on 20 August 2027. Is he in time? What is the nature of the patent that results?
📝 Practice problem — framed from topics asked in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2018 / Jul 2019 / Apr 2021: Q.8(b) / Q.6 / Q.9(a) — note and essays on the Patent Cooperation Treaty
The PCT application’s priority date is 10 January 2025.
The applicant wishes to enter the national phase in India on 20 August 2027.
2. Issues Involved
What is the time limit for entering the national phase in India?
Does the PCT grant an international patent?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Article 22 / 39, PCT: the applicant must enter the national phase within 30 months from the priority date, though a national law may allow a longer period.
Section 138, Patents Act, 1970 and the Patents Rules (Rule 20): for India the period is 31 months from the priority date.
Article 3–4, 21 PCT: a single international application; international publication after 18 months.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The PCT provides a unified procedure for filing, search and publication, but each country grants or refuses a patent under its own law. There is no ‘international patent’.
5. Application to the Present Problem
31 months from 10 January 2025 expires on 10 August 2027.
20 August 2027 is after that date, so the entry is out of time.
Even if he enters in time, the Indian Patent Office will examine the application under the Indian Act, and only then a patent is granted.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The applicant is not in time, since the 31-month period ended on 10 August 2027, and the application would lapse as regards India unless the rules allow a late entry. In any case, the PCT does not grant an international patent: the grant is by the Indian Patent Office under Indian law.
Ratio Decidendi: The national phase must be entered within the prescribed period (31 months in India); the PCT gives a common procedure, but not a patent.
P3An international registration based on an Indian trade mark application is made under the Madrid Protocol. After two years, the Indian basic application is refused. What is the effect on the international registration?
Primary Problem: ‘A’ files an application for a trade mark in India (the basic application) and, on its basis, obtains an international registration under the Madrid Protocol designating several countries. Two years later, the Indian basic application is finally refused. What is the effect on the international registration?
📝 Practice problem — framed from topics asked in past KSLU papers:
Jul 2018: Q.7 — essay: salient features of the Madrid Convention
Apr 2021: Q.9(b) — short note: international registration of mark
The international registration rests on an Indian basic application.
Two years later, the basic application is refused.
2. Issues Involved
Does the international registration survive the failure of the basic application?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Article 6, Madrid Protocol (dependency): for five years from the date of the international registration, it remains dependent on the basic application or registration. If the basic application ceases to have effect within that period, the international registration is cancelled to the same extent.
Article 9quinquies:transformation — the owner may convert the cancelled international registration into national applications in the designated countries, keeping the date, if he files within three months.
Chapter IVA, Trade Marks Act, 1999 (Sections 36A–36G): Madrid Protocol provisions in India.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Dependency (‘central attack’) is a feature of the Madrid system which makes the international registration vulnerable during its first five years, but the right of transformation reduces the loss.
5. Application to the Present Problem
The refusal occurred within the five-year dependency period, since it was after two years.
So the international registration is cancelled to the extent that the basic application fails.
A can save his position by filing national applications in each designated country within three months, and retain the date of the international registration.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The international registration will be cancelled (central attack), since the basic application failed within five years. A can transform it into separate national applications in the designated countries within three months, keeping the original date.
Ratio Decidendi: For five years an international registration depends on its basic application; if the latter fails, the international registration falls, but may be transformed into national applications.