2 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1 Parliament passes an Act which is to come into force on a date to be notified by the Central Government. A commits the prohibited act before notification. Can he be punished?
- Apr 2021: Q.2(a) — essay: “Explain the rules relating to commencement of statute.”
Marks: 10 · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- The Act received assent on 1 March, and its commencement section leaves the date to a notification.
- The Government notified 1 July as the date of commencement.
- A did the prohibited act on 20 March, between assent and commencement.
2. Issues Involved
- From which date does the Act operate: assent, publication or notified commencement?
- Can A be punished for an act done before the commencement?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Section 5, General Clauses Act, 1897: a Central Act, unless a different commencement is provided, comes into operation on the day it receives the assent of the President, and where it provides for commencement by notification, it comes into operation on the notified date.
- Article 20(1), Constitution: no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- An Act becomes law on assent, but where the Act itself leaves its commencement to a notification, its operative provisions are in abeyance until that date.
- A penal statute has no retrospective effect to create an offence. An act is an offence only if it was an offence when it was done.
5. Application to the Present Problem
- The Act is to come into force only on the date notified, namely 1 July. Until then its provisions do not operate.
- A’s act on 20 March was done before 1 July, when the offence did not exist, so it was not a violation of a law in force.
- Punishing A would breach Article 20(1) and the rule against retrospective penal laws.
6. Decision / Conclusion
A cannot be punished. The Act commenced on 1 July, the notified date, and A’s act on 20 March was not an offence when it was done.
P2 Act X, which punishes hoarding, is repealed by Act Y. A is being tried for hoarding committed before the repeal. Does the repeal end the case?
- Dec 2018: Q.5 — essay: “Discuss the consequences of a repeal of a statute.”
Marks: 10 · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- A is being prosecuted under Act X for an act done while Act X was in force.
- Act X is repealed during the trial by Act Y, which has no express saving.
2. Issues Involved
- What is the effect of repeal on pending proceedings and offences already committed?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897: unless a different intention appears, a repeal shall not (a) revive anything not in force; (b) affect the previous operation of the repealed enactment or anything duly done or suffered under it; (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under it; (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against it; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of such right, penalty or punishment, which may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act had not been passed.
- Article 20(1), Constitution: protects against conviction under a law not in force at the time of the act, but does not apply where the offence existed when committed.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- Under the common law, a repeal wiped out the statute as if it had never existed, so pending proceedings abated. Section 6 changes this, and saves what had already accrued unless the repealing Act shows a contrary intention — State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (AIR 1955 SC 84).
- A mere repeal and re-enactment, without a contrary intention, does not affect pending proceedings. The same principle governs the replacement of the IPC by the BNS.
5. Application to the Present Problem
- A’s liability arose when he hoarded the goods, under Act X, which was then in force.
- Act Y does not show an intention to wipe out pending proceedings, because there is no provision that says so.
- Section 6(d) and (e) preserve the penalty incurred and allow the proceeding to continue as if Act X had not been repealed.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The repeal does not end the prosecution. A can still be tried and punished under Act X, by virtue of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, since no contrary intention appears in Act Y.
2 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1 The preamble says that the Act is to protect tenants in cities, but Section 4 protects ‘any tenant’. A landlord argues that rural tenants are not covered. Decide.
- Dec 2018 / Apr 2021: Q.8(a) short note “Preamble”; Q.4(a) essay “Explain the importance of Preamble in interpretation of statute.”
Marks: 10 · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- The Preamble refers to tenants “in cities”.
- Section 4 protects “any tenant”, without any limit as to place.
- A landlord pleads that the Preamble confines the Act to city tenants.
2. Issues Involved
- Can the Preamble restrict or control the clear words of an enacting section?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Preamble: an introductory statement of the purpose and objects of the Act, forming part of the statute.
- Section 4 (the enacting part): protects “any tenant”.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- The Preamble is a key to the mind of the makers, and can be used to clear up an ambiguity in the enacting part, but it cannot override, restrict or enlarge the clear words of an enacting provision — Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd v. Union of India (AIR 1961 SC 954); Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co. [1899] AC 143.
- Where the enacting words are clear and unambiguous, the Preamble is not to be looked at for restricting them.
5. Application to the Present Problem
- The word “any tenant” in Section 4 is plain, with no limitation as to city or village.
- There is no ambiguity in Section 4, so there is no occasion to use the Preamble to control it.
- The Preamble describes the main concern of the Act, but does not limit the width of the section.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The landlord’s argument fails. Section 4 clearly protects “any tenant”, and the Preamble cannot restrict its plain words. The rural tenant is protected.
P2 Section 20 is headed ‘Penalty for unlicensed sale of drugs’ and punishes anyone who ‘sells or stocks’ drugs without a licence. A who only stocked drugs says the heading limits the section to sale. Decide.
- Unit 2 syllabus: Internal aids — headings, marginal notes, punctuation, schedules; Dec 2018 Q.8(a) — short note on Preamble
Marks: 10 · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- The heading and marginal note speak only of ‘sale’.
- The body of the section punishes both selling and stocking.
- A stocked drugs and had not sold them.
2. Issues Involved
- Can a heading or marginal note restrict the clear words of a section?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Headings and marginal notes: internal aids to interpretation which are part of the statute, used to understand the section but not to control it.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- Headings and marginal notes can be used to resolve a doubt about the meaning of a section, but they cannot control, restrict or enlarge words which are clear — Bhinka v. Charan Singh (AIR 1959 SC 960); Frick India Ltd v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 400.
- Where the section is clear, the heading, being a brief description, cannot reduce its scope.
5. Application to the Present Problem
- The section’s body expressly includes “stocks”, so it is clear and unambiguous.
- The heading, a short title for the section, uses only the word “sale” for convenience and cannot cut down the operative words.
- A’s stocking of drugs without a licence falls within the plain words of the section.
6. Decision / Conclusion
A’s contention is rejected. The words of the section, “sells or stocks”, are clear, and the heading cannot restrict them. A is liable for stocking drugs without a licence.
3 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1 The Industrial Disputes Act bars representation by a legal practitioner before a labour court, while the Advocates Act confers a right to practise before any authority. How is the clash to be resolved?
- Dec 2017: Q.9(a) — this problem
- Jul 2018: Q.9(b) — whether Section 36 of the ID Act is impliedly repealed by Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 restricts representation by an advocate before conciliation, and allows it before a Labour Court or Tribunal only with the consent of the other parties and the leave of the presiding officer.
- Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 gives every advocate a right to practise before any tribunal or authority.
- The two provisions appear to conflict.
2. Issues Involved
- Is Section 36 of the ID Act impliedly repealed by Section 30 of the Advocates Act?
- How should two apparently conflicting statutes be reconciled?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Section 36, ID Act, 1947: regulates who may represent parties in industrial proceedings, and permits a legal practitioner only with the consent and leave stated.
- Section 30, Advocates Act, 1961: subject to the provisions of the Act, every advocate is entitled as of right to practise in all courts, before any tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence, and before any authority before whom he is entitled to practise.
- Maxim: generalia specialibus non derogant — general words do not override a special provision.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- The Court first tries to harmonise two provisions so that both operate, and avoids a construction which makes one provision useless.
- Repeal by implication is not favoured. A later general law does not impliedly repeal an earlier special law unless an intention to do so appears clearly — Ashoka Marketing Ltd v. Punjab National Bank (1990) 4 SCC 406.
- The Supreme Court has held that the ID Act, being a special Act on industrial adjudication, continues to govern representation, and that the advocate’s right under Section 30 operates subject to it — Thyssen Krupp Industries India (P) Ltd v. Suresh Maruti Chougule (2020).
5. Application to the Present Problem
- Section 36 is a special provision for a specific field, namely industrial adjudication, intended to keep the proceedings simple and to give the parties a level footing.
- Section 30 of the Advocates Act is a general provision on the right of advocates to practise, and itself applies subject to the provisions of the Act and other laws.
- Both can operate together: an advocate has a right to practise generally, but before industrial authorities he may appear only in the manner Section 36 permits.
6. Decision / Conclusion
Section 36 of the ID Act is not repealed by implication. The two provisions are to be read harmoniously, and the special law (the ID Act) prevails in its own field, so that an advocate can appear before a Labour Court only with the consent and leave prescribed in Section 36.
P2 Mohan files a water pollution complaint in a criminal court under Section 133 of the Cr.P.C. The Magistrate refuses to entertain it, saying only the Pollution Control Board has jurisdiction under the Water Act. Advise Mohan.
- Dec 2018: Q.9(a) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- Mohan sought action against water pollution under Section 133, Cr.P.C. (public nuisance).
- The Magistrate refused, because the Water Act gives jurisdiction to the Pollution Control Board.
2. Issues Involved
- Does the Water Act oust the Magistrate’s power under Section 133, Cr.P.C.?
- How do a general procedural remedy and a special statute operate together?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Section 133, Cr.P.C. (now Section 152, BNSS): a Magistrate may make a conditional order to remove or abate a public nuisance, including the discharge of noxious matter.
- Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974: the Boards’ powers to prevent and control pollution, with Section 49 limiting the court’s cognizance of offences under the Act to complaints by the Board or with its sanction.
- Rule of harmonious construction: two statutes dealing with the same subject should be read together so as to give effect to both.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- A Magistrate’s power under Section 133 is a speedy, preventive remedy against public nuisance, and a statute should not be read as taking away a remedy unless it says so expressly or by necessary implication — Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardhichand (1980) 4 SCC 162.
- The Water Act’s bar (Section 49) concerns the cognizance of offences under that Act. It does not expressly oust the Magistrate’s preventive jurisdiction in respect of a public nuisance.
5. Application to the Present Problem
- Mohan did not prosecute for an offence under the Water Act. He sought a preventive order under Section 133, Cr.P.C. against the public nuisance of water pollution.
- The Water Act does not expressly or impliedly take away that power, and both laws can co-exist: the Board for control of pollution and prosecution, the Magistrate for the speedy abatement of nuisance.
- Mohan can also complain to the Pollution Control Board, which alone may prosecute under the Water Act.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The Magistrate’s refusal is not justified merely because the Pollution Control Board has powers under the Water Act. Mohan can proceed under Section 133, Cr.P.C. for abatement of the nuisance, and may also approach the Board for action under the Water Act.
P3 Two laws, the Special Courts Act, 1992 and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks Act, 1993, both contain non-obstante clauses on the jurisdiction over recovery. Resolve the clash.
- Dec 2018: Q.9(c) — this problem
- Jul 2017: Q.6 — essay on non-obstante and saving clauses
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- The Special Courts Act, 1992 vests jurisdiction in the Special Court over certain property and bars every other court.
- The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 vests recovery of bank debts in Debts Recovery Tribunals.
- Both contain non-obstante clauses overriding other laws.
2. Issues Involved
- Which of the two overriding clauses prevails?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Non-obstante clause: “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law”, it gives overriding effect to the provision over other laws.
- Rules of resolution: (i) read both harmoniously, (ii) apply the dominant purpose of each Act, (iii) if irreconcilable, the later enactment prevails, and (iv) a special Act in its own field prevails over a general one.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- A non-obstante clause cannot be read in isolation; the Court looks at the purpose and the area of operation of each Act, and tries to reconcile them. Where two non-obstante clauses conflict, the later one generally prevails, but the Court first examines the purpose of each — Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank (2000) 4 SCC 406.
- The Special Courts Act was made for a specific problem (securities transactions in a defined period, and property of notified persons), and the 1993 Act for the general recovery of bank debts — see Solidaire India Ltd v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd (2001) 3 SCC 71 on the primacy of the Special Courts Act in its own field.
5. Application to the Present Problem
- The Special Courts Act operates in a narrow, specific field: transactions in securities and property of notified persons. Its overriding clause is to be read as confined to that field.
- The 1993 Act governs the broad class of bank and financial institution debts and is later in time.
- The conflict arises only where the same property or debt falls within both. The clauses should be harmonised, with the Special Courts Act prevailing in the matters specially assigned to it and the 1993 Act in other bank debts.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The conflict is resolved by harmonious construction and by looking at the dominant purpose of each Act. The Special Courts Act prevails in the specific field assigned to it; for all other debts of banks and financial institutions the 1993 Act and the Tribunals have jurisdiction. If the two are irreconcilable, the later enactment (1993) would prevail.
3 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1 Suraj is convicted under Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, although he did not know that the food article was adulterated. He challenges the conviction. Decide.
- Dec 2017: Q.9(b) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- Suraj contravened Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
- He did not know that the article of food was adulterated, so he lacked a guilty mind.
- He challenges his conviction for want of mens rea.
2. Issues Involved
- Is mens rea an ingredient of an offence under Section 7 of the Act?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Section 7, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: no person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute any article of food which is adulterated, misbranded or otherwise in contravention of the Act.
- Presumption of mens rea: a person is presumed not to be guilty of a crime unless he has a guilty mind, unless the statute excludes it expressly or by necessary implication.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- There is a strong presumption that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a statutory offence, but it can be displaced by the words of the statute, its subject matter and its object. In statutes dealing with public welfare, the presumption is readily displaced — State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George (AIR 1965 SC 722); Sweet v. Parsley [1970] AC 132.
- The Supreme Court has held that the Food Adulteration Act creates an offence of strict liability, so that guilty knowledge need not be proved, because the object is to protect public health — Nathu Lal v. State of M.P. (AIR 1966 SC 43).
5. Application to the Present Problem
- The Act is a welfare law, whose purpose is to protect the public from adulterated food.
- If the prosecution had to prove knowledge of adulteration, the Act would be easily defeated, because it is the seller who is in a position to guard against it.
- Section 7 speaks of what is done, not of the state of mind, and the Act provides specific defences (such as the warranty defence).
6. Decision / Conclusion
Suraj’s challenge fails. Section 7 creates an offence of strict liability, and mens rea is not required, in view of the object of the Act. The conviction is valid, subject to the statutory defences.
P2 Workmen strike without notice. The Labour Court holds the strike illegal. The employer sues the trade union in a civil court for damages for loss of business. The union says the civil court’s jurisdiction is ousted. Decide.
- Jul 2018: Q.9(a) — this problem
- Dec 2017 / Dec 2018: Q.4 — essay on interpretation of statutes affecting jurisdiction of courts
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- The workmen struck work without notice, and the Labour Court held the strike illegal and denied wages.
- The employer sues the union in a civil court for damages for loss during the strike.
- The union says the Industrial Disputes Act ousts the jurisdiction of the civil court.
2. Issues Involved
- Does the Industrial Disputes Act, expressly or impliedly, oust the civil court’s jurisdiction to award damages for the employer’s loss?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Section 9, C.P.C.: civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature unless their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred.
- Section 24, ID Act, 1947: defines illegal strikes and prescribes penalties.
- Sections 17–18, Trade Unions Act, 1926: limited immunity of registered unions and their officers from criminal and civil proceedings for acts done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- Jurisdiction of civil courts is presumed, and a statute that ousts it must be construed strictly. Ouster is inferred only where the statute creates a right or liability and provides a special remedy and forum for it — Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. (AIR 1969 SC 78).
- Where the right is created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the remedy lies under it alone; but a right not created by the Act, such as a common-law claim in tort, may be enforced in the civil court — Premier Automobiles Ltd v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke (1976) 1 SCC 496.
5. Application to the Present Problem
- The Industrial Disputes Act prescribes remedies for industrial disputes between employer and workmen, such as wages, reinstatement and so on; it does not provide any forum or remedy for the employer’s claim for damages from the union.
- The employer’s claim for damages for loss of business is not a right created by the Act, so the Act does not expressly or by necessary implication bar the civil suit.
- The union’s protection lies not in ouster of jurisdiction but in its defences on the merits, such as the limited immunity under the Trade Unions Act, and whether the employer can prove a cause of action.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The union’s argument fails. The civil court’s jurisdiction is not ousted, since the ID Act neither expressly nor by necessary implication bars a suit for damages. The court may try the suit, and the union may raise its defences on the merits.
P3 There is an arbitration agreement between the parties, but they approach the consumer forum. Can the consumer forum be compelled to refer the dispute to arbitration under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act?
- Jul 2019: Q.9(a) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- The parties have an arbitration agreement.
- They nevertheless approach a consumer forum.
- The question is whether the forum must refer them to arbitration under Section 8(1).
2. Issues Involved
- Does Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 compel a consumer forum to refer the parties to arbitration?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Section 8(1), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: a judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.
- Section 3, Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (now Section 100 of the 2019 Act): the remedies provided are in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law.
- Rule: a later or general law does not override a special beneficial law unless clearly intended; the beneficial statute is liberally construed.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- The Consumer Protection Act is a special, beneficial statute, which gives the consumer an additional, speedy remedy. An arbitration clause therefore does not bar the consumer forum from entertaining a complaint — National Seeds Corporation Ltd v. M. Madhusudhan Reddy (2012) 2 SCC 506.
- A consumer forum is not bound to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8 — Emaar MGF Land Ltd v. Aftab Singh (2019) 12 SCC 751.
5. Application to the Present Problem
- Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act says its remedies are in addition to other laws, and so the consumer’s right to approach the forum is not taken away by the arbitration agreement.
- Section 8 of the Arbitration Act is a general provision on referral, while the Consumer Protection Act is a special, beneficial law with a policy of protecting consumers by speedy and inexpensive redress.
- Reading both together, Section 8 does not mandate the consumer forum to refer the dispute.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The consumer forum cannot be mandated to refer the dispute to arbitration under Section 8(1). The consumer’s remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is an additional remedy, and the arbitration clause does not oust the forum’s jurisdiction.
4 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1 An employer calculates a woman’s maternity benefit for six weeks of absence but excludes Sundays. Meena claims wages for Sundays also. Advise her.
- Dec 2017: Q.9(c) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- Under the Maternity Benefit Act, a woman is paid wages for the period of her actual absence.
- The employer excludes the Sundays falling within the six weeks.
- Meena claims payment for Sundays also.
2. Issues Involved
- Is a woman entitled to maternity benefit for Sundays and holidays falling within her period of absence?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Section 5, Maternity Benefit Act, 1961: a woman is entitled to maternity benefit at the rate of the average daily wage for the period of her actual absence, immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and for the six weeks immediately following that day.
- Rule: a beneficial or welfare statute is construed liberally in favour of those for whose benefit it is enacted.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- The Maternity Benefit Act is a social welfare measure, and must be interpreted in the manner that best advances its object, which is to protect motherhood and enable the woman to recover — B. Shah v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore (AIR 1978 SC 12); Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) (2000) 3 SCC 224.
- In B. Shah the Supreme Court held that Sundays and holidays that intervene are to be included in the period for which maternity benefit is payable.
5. Application to the Present Problem
- The statutory words are the “period of her actual absence”. A Sunday that falls within the six weeks is part of that continuous absence from work.
- The purpose of the benefit is to maintain the woman and the child during the entire period, and a Sunday does not reduce that need.
- Excluding Sundays would cut down the benefit contrary to the object of the Act.
6. Decision / Conclusion
Meena’s claim is valid. Maternity benefit is payable for the whole period of absence, including Sundays and other holidays falling within it, and the employer must pay for the Sundays also.
P2 A Muslim minor can claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C., and the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 also provides for children’s maintenance. Under which law can the minor claim?
- Dec 2018: Q.9(b) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- A minor child has a right to maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C.
- The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 also enables a divorced Muslim woman to claim maintenance for her children.
2. Issues Involved
- Is the minor’s remedy under Section 125 Cr.P.C. taken away by the 1986 Act, or are both available?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Section 125, Cr.P.C. (now Section 144, BNSS): a Magistrate may order a person with sufficient means to pay maintenance to his wife, legitimate or illegitimate minor child, and parents, if they are unable to maintain themselves.
- Section 3(1)(b), Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986: a divorced woman is entitled to a reasonable provision and maintenance for the children born to her before or after divorce, for a period of two years from birth.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- Provisions conferring benefits are to be construed liberally and harmoniously, so as to give maximum benefit. A later special law does not take away an existing general remedy unless it expressly says so.
- The Supreme Court held that the 1986 Act does not affect the right of a Muslim child to claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. — Noor Saba Khatoon v. Mohd. Quasim (1997) 6 SCC 233. The 1986 Act was upheld in Danial Latifi v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740, which also read it to protect the woman’s rights fully.
5. Application to the Present Problem
- Section 125 is a secular, beneficial provision, which applies to children of all religions, and the right of the child is independent of the mother’s rights.
- The 1986 Act contains no word that takes away the children’s right under Section 125. The two remedies can co-exist and the child gets the benefit of the more beneficial provision.
- Reading both together gives the child a wider protection.
6. Decision / Conclusion
A Muslim minor can claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. notwithstanding the 1986 Act. The 1986 Act gives an additional right to the mother in respect of the children, and the two remedies are cumulative and not alternatives.
P3 An appraiser whom a bank often engages to weigh and test gold ornaments offered as security claims to be a ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Decide.
- Jul 2019: Q.9(b) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- The bank engages the appraiser from time to time, to weigh and test gold ornaments offered as security.
- The appraiser claims to be a ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the ID Act.
2. Issues Involved
- Does the appraiser come within the definition of ‘workman’?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Section 2(s), ID Act, 1947: “workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- The essential requirement is a relationship of employer and employee, that is, a contract of service. The test is the degree of control and supervision, the integration of the person into the establishment, and the nature of the engagement — Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd v. State of Saurashtra (AIR 1957 SC 264); Hussainbhai v. Alath Factory Thozhilali Union (1978) 4 SCC 257.
- A person engaged for a particular job, paid per job, and free to work for others is an independent contractor, not a workman.
5. Application to the Present Problem
- The appraiser’s service is “often sought” by the bank; he is called as and when required and is not a regular employee.
- He is a professional who exercises his own skill and judgment in weighing and testing, with no day-to-day control by the bank. He is likely to be paid per appraisal and to work for other banks.
- There is therefore no contract of service, and the relationship is one of independent professional engagement.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The appraiser is not a ‘workman’ under Section 2(s). There is no relationship of employer and employee. He is an independent professional engaged as required, and cannot invoke the ID Act. (The result would be different if facts showed regular employment, control and supervision by the bank.)
P4 A’s car is insured against theft. It is stolen by passengers to whom he gave a free lift. The insurance company denies the claim. Decide.
- Jul 2019: Q.9(c) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
- A’s car was insured against theft.
- The car was stolen by passengers to whom A gave a free lift.
- The insurer repudiated the claim.
2. Issues Involved
- Is the insurer entitled to refuse the claim because the thieves were persons to whom the insured gave a lift?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Contract of insurance: the policy is read as a whole to find the risks covered and the exclusions.
- Rule of contra proferentem: an ambiguity in a document drafted by one party is construed against that party, and exceptions or exclusions in an insurance policy are construed strictly against the insurer.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
- The insurance contract is one of utmost good faith, and the terms are strictly construed. An insurer can refuse a claim only if there is a clear exclusion or a fundamental breach of a condition that caused the loss — Narinder Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd (2014) 9 SCC 324.
- Where the insured peril (theft) has occurred, and the breach of a condition, such as carrying passengers, has not caused or contributed to the loss, the claim is settled on a non-standard basis rather than repudiated — Amalendu Sahoo v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd (2010) 4 SCC 536.
5. Application to the Present Problem
- The policy covers theft, and the car has been stolen, so the insured event has occurred.
- A giving a free lift to strangers is a lapse of prudence, but not an act that is expressly excluded, and it is not a fundamental breach going to the root of the contract. The insurer must show a clear exclusion.
- Exceptions in a policy are construed strictly, against the insurer.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The insurer’s repudiation is not justified. A is entitled to be compensated for the theft of the car. If the policy has a condition that was breached by giving the lift, the claim may be settled on a non-standard basis (a reduced percentage), but it cannot be rejected outright.