FILAD model solutions to the problems asked in past KSLU papers (Dec 2018 to Nov 2021), grouped by unit
Unit 1 — Jurisdiction, Foreign Judgments, Place of Suing, Transfer of Suits
5 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1Sunil (Davanagere) took a loan from Prakash (Shivamogga) at Davanagere and has not repaid it. Prakash sues him for recovery at Shivamogga. Sunil objects to the jurisdiction. Decide.
Primary Problem: Sunil is a permanent resident of Davanagere and Prakash is a permanent resident of Shivamogga. Sunil has taken a loan from Prakash at Davanagere and has not repaid it. Prakash has instituted a suit for recovery of the loan against Sunil at Shivamogga. Sunil has raised an objection as to jurisdiction. Decide.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2018: Q.9(a) — this problem (Sunil and Prakash)
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Defendant Sunil permanently resides at Davanagere; plaintiff Prakash permanently resides at Shivamogga.
The loan was taken at Davanagere and has not been repaid.
Prakash sued at Shivamogga, and Sunil objected to the territorial jurisdiction of that Court.
2. Issues Involved
Which Court has territorial jurisdiction in a suit for recovery of money: that of the plaintiff’s residence, the defendant’s residence, or the place where the cause of action arose?
Is the objection of Sunil sustainable, and what is its effect?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 20, C.P.C.: Subject to the limitations in Sections 15 to 19, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction (a) the defendant (or each of the defendants) at the time of commencement of the suit actually and voluntarily resides, carries on business or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants resides, carries on business or personally works for gain (with leave of the Court, or if the other defendants acquiesce); or (c) the cause of action wholly or in part arises.
Section 21: an objection to the place of suing must be taken at the earliest opportunity, and before the issues are settled.
Order VII Rule 10: where the plaint is filed in a Court that lacks jurisdiction, it must be returned to be presented to the proper Court.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The residence of the plaintiff is irrelevant under Section 20. The suit lies where the defendant resides or carries on business, or where the cause of action arises.
Cause of action is the bundle of facts which the plaintiff must prove to get relief — ABC Laminart (P) Ltd v. A.P. Agencies (1989) 2 SCC 163. In a loan suit, it arises where the loan was advanced, and also where, by the contract, the loan was to be repaid.
Parties can by agreement choose between Courts that already have jurisdiction, but cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court that has none — Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd (1971) 1 SCC 286.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Sunil resides at Davanagere, so a Court at Davanagere has jurisdiction under Section 20(a).
The loan was taken at Davanagere, so part of the cause of action arose there under Section 20(c). Nothing in the problem shows that any part of the cause of action arose at Shivamogga, for example that the contract required repayment there.
Prakash’s residence at Shivamogga gives the Shivamogga Court no jurisdiction. The objection was raised at the first opportunity, so Section 21 does not defeat it.
6. Decision / Conclusion
Sunil’s objection is valid. The Court at Shivamogga lacks territorial jurisdiction, and the plaint should be returned under Order VII Rule 10 for presentation before the competent Court at Davanagere. The suit is not dismissed. The position would differ only if the contract fixed Shivamogga as the place of repayment.
Ratio Decidendi: A suit for money lies where the defendant resides or where the cause of action arises (Section 20). The plaintiff’s residence does not confer jurisdiction.
P2A sues B in a foreign court and the suit is dismissed. A wants to file the same suit against B in India on the same cause of action. Can he?
Primary Problem: ‘A’ sues ‘B’ in a foreign court. The suit is dismissed. Thereafter ‘A’ wants to file the same suit against ‘B’ in India on the same cause of action. Whether he can institute a suit? Decide.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2018: Q.9(b) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
A sued B in a foreign court on a cause of action, and the suit was dismissed.
A now wants to file the same suit against B in India on the same cause of action.
2. Issues Involved
Is the foreign judgment of dismissal conclusive between A and B under Section 13 C.P.C.?
Is a fresh suit in India barred?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 13, C.P.C.: A foreign judgment is conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties, except where it (a) was not pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction; (b) has not been given on the merits of the case; (c) appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded on an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognise Indian law applicable; (d) was obtained in proceedings opposed to natural justice; (e) was obtained by fraud; or (f) sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India.
Section 14: the Court shall presume, on production of a certified copy, that a foreign judgment was pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears on the record (this can be rebutted by proof that the Court lacked jurisdiction).
Section 11: the principle of res judicata, which Section 13 extends to foreign judgments.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
A judgment is “on the merits” only if the Court applied its mind to the truth or falsity of the claim, on evidence or admission. A dismissal for default, technical or procedural reasons is not a decision on the merits — Moloji Nar Singh Rao v. Shankar Saran (AIR 1962 SC 1737).
A decree passed without considering evidence, for example a default or summary decree, is not on the merits — International Woolen Mills v. Standard Wool (UK) Ltd (2001) 5 SCC 265.
Competence of the foreign Court in the international sense (for example, the defendant’s residence or submission) is examined — R. Viswanathan v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid (AIR 1963 SC 1).
5. Application to the Present Problem
If the foreign Court was competent and dismissed A’s suit on the merits after considering the evidence, the judgment is conclusive under Section 13 between A and B. A cannot re-litigate the same cause of action in India, as the matter is, in effect, res judicata.
If the foreign Court dismissed the suit on a technical ground, such as default, want of jurisdiction or a procedural defect, or if one of the exceptions (a) to (f) applies, the judgment is not conclusive, and A may file a fresh suit in India.
6. Decision / Conclusion
A cannot sue again if the foreign Court was competent and dismissed the suit on the merits, as Section 13 makes the judgment conclusive. He can sue in India if the dismissal was not on the merits or falls within any exception to Section 13. The answer depends on the ground of dismissal.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 13, a foreign judgment on the merits by a competent Court is conclusive and bars a fresh suit in India on the same cause of action; a judgment not on the merits has no such effect.
P3Rajan sues his wife Rajani in a Civil Court at Dharwad. She lives with her parents at Tumakuru, has no income, and finds it difficult to travel to Dharwad. Advise her.
Primary Problem: Rajan has instituted a suit against his wife Rajani in the Civil Court at Dharwad. Rajani is residing at Tumakuru with her parents. She has no income of her own and therefore she is finding it difficult to travel to Dharwad frequently to attend the proceedings. Advise her.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2020: Q.9(a) — this problem
Apr 2021 / Nov 2021: Q.2(a) — essay on rules for transfer of suits
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Rajan sued his wife Rajani in the Civil Court at Dharwad.
Rajani lives with her parents at Tumakuru, and has no income of her own.
Frequent travel to Dharwad to attend the proceedings is difficult for her.
2. Issues Involved
Can the suit be transferred from Dharwad to a Court at Tumakuru?
Which authority can order the transfer, and on what grounds?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 24, C.P.C.: on the application of any of the parties, and after notice to the parties and hearing them, the High Court or the District Court may (a) transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it, or (b) withdraw any suit pending in a Court subordinate to it and try it or transfer it to another Court competent to try it. A District Court can transfer only within its own district.
Section 25: the Supreme Court may transfer a suit from a Court in one State to a Court in another State, if satisfied that it is expedient for the ends of justice.
Section 21A, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: transfer of matrimonial petitions, where the proceeding is under that Act.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The test for transfer is whether the ends of justice require it, and the convenience of the parties is a main consideration. In matrimonial matters, the convenience of the wife is generally given weight, particularly where she is financially weak and has to travel to a distant Court — Sumita Singh v. Kumar Sanjay (2002) 1 SCC 168; Anindita Das v. Srijit Das (2006) 9 SCC 197.
Transfer is not granted for mere inconvenience, but it is granted where there is real hardship or a likelihood of denial of a fair hearing — Kulwinder Kaur v. Kandi Friends Education Trust (2008) 3 SCC 659.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Dharwad and Tumakuru are in different districts of Karnataka, so a District Court cannot transfer the suit; the application should be made to the High Court of Karnataka under Section 24 (Section 25 would apply only if the Courts were in different States).
Rajani can show real hardship: she has no income, she is staying with her parents at Tumakuru, and the repeated trips to Dharwad are costly and difficult. Rajan, as the husband, who chose to sue at Dharwad, has the means to travel.
She should apply for transfer of the suit to the competent Court at Tumakuru, and ask for notice to Rajan and for interim directions on expenses if needed.
6. Decision / Conclusion
Rajani should file an application under Section 24 C.P.C. before the High Court of Karnataka for transfer of the suit from Dharwad to the competent Court at Tumakuru. In view of her financial position and the convenience of the wife, the transfer will normally be allowed.
Ratio Decidendi: On an application of a party, the High Court may transfer a suit under Section 24 in the interest of justice. Courts give special weight to the convenience of a financially weak wife.
P4Anil, resident of Bellary, publishes a newspaper with statements defamatory of Basant. It circulates in Bidar, Bellary, Kalaburgi and Raichur. Where can Basant sue?
Primary Problem: Anil, who is a resident of Bellary, publishes a newspaper containing statements defamatory of Basant. The newspaper is circulated in Bidar, Bellary, Kalaburgi and Raichur. Basant desires to institute a suit against Anil. Where can he institute the suit?
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Jul 2019: Q.9(a) — this problem
Nov 2021: Q.1(b) — ‘A’ residing in Delhi publishes in Calcutta defamatory statements to ‘B’; newspaper circulated in Bombay, Madras and Raipur; where can ‘B’ sue?
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three); 6 in the 2021 paper · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Anil resides in Bellary and publishes a newspaper containing defamatory statements about Basant.
The newspaper circulates in Bidar, Bellary, Kalaburgi and Raichur.
Basant wants to sue Anil for defamation.
2. Issues Involved
Where can a suit for compensation for defamation (a wrong to the person) be instituted?
Does Basant have a choice among the places of circulation?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 19, C.P.C.: Where a suit is for compensation for wrong done to the person or to movable property, if the wrong was done within the local limits of the jurisdiction of one Court and the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, within the local limits of another Court, the suit may be instituted at the option of the plaintiff in either of the said Courts.
Illustration (b) to Section 19: A, residing in Delhi, publishes in Calcutta statements defamatory of B. B may sue A either in Calcutta or in Delhi.
Section 20(c): the cause of action wholly or in part arises.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The wrong of defamation is complete where the defamatory matter is published and read (communicated to a third person). Each place where the newspaper is circulated and read is a place where the wrong is done, at least in part.
The plaintiff has an option; the defendant’s residence is one place, and the place of the wrong is another. The plaintiff’s own residence is not a ground of jurisdiction.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Anil resides at Bellary, which is the place of his residence (Sections 19 and 20(a)), so Basant can sue at Bellary.
The newspaper was published and circulated in Bidar, Kalaburgi and Raichur, so the wrong was done in each of those places as well. Basant may sue in any of those Courts.
Basant may choose the Court that is most convenient, but he should file only one suit on the whole of the cause of action (Order II Rule 2).
6. Decision / Conclusion
Basant may institute the suit at his option in the Court at Bellary (where Anil resides) or in the Courts at Bidar, Kalaburgi or Raichur, where the defamatory newspaper was circulated and the wrong was done, subject to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 19, for a wrong to the person, the plaintiff may sue where the wrong was done or where the defendant resides. For defamation, the wrong is done where the publication is read.
P5Rajesh sues Shekhar for Rs. 1 lakh in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge. The suit is tried, and at the stage of arguments Shekhar contends that the Court has no jurisdiction. Decide.
Primary Problem: Rajesh has instituted a suit against Shekhar for recovery of Rs. 1 lakh in the Court of Senior Civil Judge. The suit is tried by the Court and at the stage of arguments Shekhar contends that the Court has no jurisdiction to decide the case. Decide.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2019: Q.9(a) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Rajesh filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 1 lakh in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge.
The Court tried the suit; at the stage of arguments Shekhar raised the objection that the Court has no jurisdiction.
2. Issues Involved
Can an objection to jurisdiction be raised for the first time at the stage of arguments?
Does the nature of the defect (territorial, pecuniary or inherent) make a difference?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 21, C.P.C.: No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional Court unless it was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. A similar rule applies to objections to the competence of a Court with reference to its pecuniary limits (Section 21(2)).
Section 15: every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it.
Section 11, Suits Valuation Act, 1887: objections to over- or under-valuation of a suit are not entertained on appeal unless raised early and prejudice is shown.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Objections to territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction are waivable. They must be taken at the first opportunity and before the issues are settled, failing which they are treated as waived — Hira Lal Patni v. Kali Nath (AIR 1962 SC 199).
A defect of inherent jurisdiction (over the subject matter) goes to the root of the matter and cannot be waived by consent; the decree is then a nullity — Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (AIR 1954 SC 340). But, even then, a decree is not to be set aside solely for a pecuniary defect unless there is a failure of justice.
A suit of Rs. 1 lakh may be tried by a Senior Civil Judge (a higher Court), and Section 15 only directs that suits be filed in the lowest competent Court; instituting in a higher Court is an irregularity, not a nullity.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Shekhar took the objection at the stage of arguments, after the trial, and not at the earliest opportunity or before the settlement of issues. Under Section 21 the objection is deemed waived.
A Senior Civil Judge can try a suit of Rs. 1 lakh, and no failure of justice is shown. If the objection concerns the territorial or pecuniary limit, it is therefore too late.
Only if the objection were about the inherent lack of jurisdiction (for example, that a statute bars the Civil Court) could it be raised at any stage, but nothing of that kind is suggested.
6. Decision / Conclusion
Shekhar’s objection is rejected. An objection to territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction taken for the first time at the arguments stage is too late and is deemed waived under Section 21. The Court will proceed to decide the suit on its merits.
Ratio Decidendi: Objections to the place of suing or the pecuniary limit must be taken at the earliest opportunity and before issues are settled (Section 21); an objection taken at the arguments stage is waived, except for a defect of inherent jurisdiction.
Unit 2 — Summons, Parties and Pleadings
3 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1In a suit, the defendant refused to accept the summons issued to him. The process server left the summons on a table in the defendant’s house. Is the service valid?
Primary Problem: In a suit the defendant refused to accept the summons which was issued to him. The process server left the summons on a table in the defendant’s house. Is the service valid?
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2019: Q.9(b) — this problem
Apr 2021 / Nov 2021: Q.3(a) / Q.4(a) — essays on modes of service of summons
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Summons was issued to the defendant, and he refused to accept it.
The process server left the summons on a table in the defendant’s house, and did not affix it on the door.
2. Issues Involved
What must a serving officer do when the defendant refuses to accept a summons?
Is leaving the summons on a table inside the house valid service?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Order V Rule 12: wherever practicable, service shall be made on the defendant in person, or on his agent.
Order V Rule 17: where the defendant or his agent refuses to sign the acknowledgment, or cannot be found, the serving officer shall affix a copy of the summons on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the house in which the defendant ordinarily resides, and shall return the original to the Court with a report stating that he has so affixed it, the circumstances, and the name and address of the person by whom the house was identified and in whose presence the copy was affixed.
Order V Rule 19: the Court may examine the serving officer and, if satisfied, declare that the summons has been duly served; otherwise it may direct fresh service.
Order V Rules 9(5) and 20: deemed service on refusal in service by registered post, and substituted service by affixture, publication or other means.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Service of summons is essential to a fair hearing. The mode of service prescribed by the Code must be strictly followed, and the serving officer’s report must show compliance.
Where the defendant refuses to accept, service is made by affixing the copy on the outer door or a conspicuous part of the house, in the presence of respectable witnesses, and with a report. A mere leaving of the paper inside the house is not the mode in the Rule.
If summons is not duly served, an ex parte decree is liable to be set aside under Order IX Rule 13.
5. Application to the Present Problem
The defendant refused to accept the summons, so Rule 17 applies: the process server should have affixed a copy on the outer door or some conspicuous part of the house.
Leaving the summons on a table in the house is neither tender nor affixture in the way required. There is also no report with the names of identifying persons and witnesses.
The Court can examine the process server under Rule 19. If the report does not show compliance with Rule 17, the Court should not hold the service to be valid.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The service is not valid, since the process server did not follow Order V Rule 17 (affixture on the outer door or a conspicuous part of the house, with report and witnesses). The Court should direct fresh service, or substituted service under Rule 20, and should not proceed ex parte on this service.
Ratio Decidendi: When a defendant refuses to accept summons, it must be served by affixing a copy to the outer door or a conspicuous part of his house, with a proper report (Order V Rule 17). Leaving it on a table is not valid service.
P2Oxford and Cambridge Universities file a joint suit against Ramesh, who has published books under the banner “Oxford and Cambridge University Press”. Is the joinder of plaintiffs valid?
Primary Problem: Ramesh has published books under the banner “Oxford and Cambridge University Press”. Oxford University and Cambridge University have instituted a joint suit against Ramesh. Is the joinder of plaintiffs valid?
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2020: Q.9(b) — this problem
Apr 2021 / Nov 2021: Q.3(b) — short note on joinder of parties
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Ramesh publishes books under the banner “Oxford and Cambridge University Press”.
Oxford University and Cambridge University have together filed one suit against Ramesh.
2. Issues Involved
Can two plaintiffs, each with its own right, join in one suit under Order I Rule 1?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Order I Rule 1, C.P.C.: All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs where (a) any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist in such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative; and (b) if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise.
Order I Rule 2: the Court may order separate trials where the joinder may embarrass or delay the trial.
Order I Rule 9: no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties.
Order I Rule 10(2): the Court may strike out or add parties at any stage.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Joinder of plaintiffs is permitted where both conditions of Rule 1 are satisfied: the same act or transaction, and a common question of law or fact. The object is to avoid multiplicity of suits.
Each plaintiff need not have an identical right; it is enough that the rights arise out of the same act and the same issues arise.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Ramesh’s publication of books under a single banner combining both names is one act which allegedly infringes the rights (name and mark) of both Universities. Their rights to relief arise out of that same act.
If Oxford and Cambridge sued separately, common questions would arise, for example whether the banner is deceptive or infringing, and whether Ramesh should be restrained.
Even if the joinder were irregular, under Rule 9 the suit would not be defeated, and the Court could order separate trials under Rule 2.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The joinder of the two Universities as plaintiffs is valid. Both conditions of Order I Rule 1 are satisfied: their rights arise from the same act of Ramesh, and common questions of law and fact would arise in separate suits.
Ratio Decidendi: Plaintiffs may be joined where their right to relief arises from the same act or transaction and common questions would arise (Order I Rule 1); misjoinder does not defeat a suit (Rule 9).
P3Ramesh sues Santosh for possession of a house on the ground that he purchased it from Santosh. He now wants to amend the plaint to claim possession as a tenant. Can he succeed?
Primary Problem: Ramesh has instituted a suit against Santosh, seeking possession of a house on the ground that he has purchased the same from Santosh. Now he wants to amend the plaint to the effect that he is entitled to the possession of the house as a tenant. Can he succeed?
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Jul 2019: Q.9(b) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Ramesh’s suit seeks possession of a house on the ground that he purchased it from Santosh.
He now seeks to amend the plaint to say that he is entitled to possession as a tenant.
2. Issues Involved
Can the plaint be amended to substitute a claim as tenant for a claim as purchaser?
Does the amendment change the nature of the suit or introduce a new, inconsistent cause of action?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Order VI Rule 17, C.P.C.: the Court may at any stage allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.
Proviso (inserted in 2002): after the commencement of trial, no application for amendment shall be allowed unless the Court concludes that, in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.
Order VI Rule 18: the amendment must be made within the time allowed, failing which it cannot be made.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Amendments are to be liberally allowed to decide the real controversy, but not if they change the character of the suit, introduce a totally different, new or inconsistent case, or take away a legal right accrued to the other side, such as a bar of limitation — Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply (1969) 1 SCC 869.
Relevant factors are whether the amendment is necessary and bona fide, whether it causes prejudice that cannot be compensated by costs, whether it introduces a time-barred claim, and whether it is sought after the trial has begun — Revajeetu Builders & Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons (2009) 10 SCC 84.
A party cannot by amendment withdraw a clear admission made in the pleadings, if it would prejudice the other side.
5. Application to the Present Problem
The original case is that Ramesh is the owner, having bought the house from Santosh. The proposed case is that Ramesh is a tenant of Santosh, which means Santosh is the owner and landlord.
The two cases are mutually inconsistent: the second admits that Santosh is the owner, and rests on a different cause of action (tenancy, which is governed by different rules such as termination of tenancy), and completely changes the nature of the suit.
If the application is made after the trial has begun, the proviso to Rule 17 further bars it, unless due diligence is shown.
6. Decision / Conclusion
Ramesh is unlikely to succeed. The amendment substitutes an inconsistent case and a new cause of action, and changes the nature of the suit. The Court will normally refuse it, particularly if the trial has begun. At most, if made at a very early stage and without prejudice, the Court may allow a fresh plea only if it is consistent with the original case, which is not the case here.
Ratio Decidendi: An amendment is allowed only if necessary to decide the real controversy; it cannot change the nature of the suit or substitute a new and inconsistent cause of action.
Unit 3 — Appearance, Judgment, Decree and Execution
3 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1Ravi is served with summons but, on the date of hearing, is in hospital with a serious illness. The Court passes an ex parte decree for Rs. 2 lakh. Fifteen days later he wants it set aside. Advise.
Primary Problem: Ravi, a defendant, was duly served with summons. On the date of hearing he was admitted in a hospital with a serious illness, and the Court proceeded ex parte and passed a decree against him for Rs. 2 lakh. Fifteen days after the decree, he wants to get it set aside. Advise him.
📝 Practice problem — framed from topics asked in past KSLU papers:
Nov 2021: Q.6(a) — essay: “What is an ex parte decree? State the remedies available against it.”
Ravi was duly served but could not attend the hearing, because he was in hospital with a serious illness.
The Court passed an ex parte decree for Rs. 2 lakh against him.
Fifteen days later he wants to set the decree aside.
2. Issues Involved
Is illness a “sufficient cause” for non-appearance under Order IX Rule 13?
Is the application in time?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Order IX Rule 6: the Court may proceed ex parte if the defendant does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing.
Order IX Rule 13: the defendant against whom an ex parte decree is passed may apply to set it aside, and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing, the Court shall set aside the decree on such terms as to costs or otherwise.
Article 123, Limitation Act, 1963: thirty days from the date of the decree, or, where the summons was not duly served, from the date when the applicant had knowledge of the decree.
Other remedies: an appeal against the ex parte decree (Section 96(2)) and review (Order XLVII).
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
“Sufficient cause” is read liberally, and the Court asks whether the defendant acted with reasonable care and was prevented by circumstances beyond his control — Parimal v. Veena alias Bharti (2011) 3 SCC 545.
Serious illness, supported by medical proof, is the commonest example of sufficient cause, since a party cannot be expected to attend while in hospital.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Ravi was duly served, so the first ground (non-service) is not available. He must rely on the second: prevented by sufficient cause.
His hospitalisation on the date of hearing is a good ground if he proves it with the hospital record and medical certificate, in an affidavit.
The decree is 15 days old, so the application is within the 30 days of Article 123.
6. Decision / Conclusion
Ravi should file an application under Order IX Rule 13 within 30 days of the decree, with an affidavit and medical proof of his hospitalisation. The decree will ordinarily be set aside, perhaps on payment of costs, and the suit will be restored for a hearing with him present.
Ratio Decidendi: An ex parte decree must be set aside under Order IX Rule 13 if the defendant shows that he was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause, such as serious illness, and applies within 30 days.
P2A decree-holder seeks to attach the judgment-debtor’s house, plough and bullocks, wearing apparel and agricultural land. The judgment-debtor is an agriculturist. Which are liable to attachment?
Primary Problem: A decree for Rs. 1 lakh has been passed against Mohan, an agriculturist. The decree-holder applies in execution to attach (i) the house in which Mohan lives, (ii) his plough, implements and the bullocks used for cultivation, (iii) his wearing apparel and cooking vessels, and (iv) his agricultural land. Which of these are liable to attachment and sale?
📝 Practice problem — framed from topics asked in past KSLU papers:
Nov 2021: Q.5(a) — essay: “Explain the properties which are not liable for attachment and sale in an execution of a decree.”
Apr 2021: Q.5(a) — essay on the modes of execution of a decree
A money decree stands against Mohan, an agriculturist.
The decree-holder seeks to attach his residential house, farming implements and bullocks, clothes and utensils, and agricultural land.
2. Issues Involved
Which items of property are exempt from attachment and sale under Section 60?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 60(1), C.P.C.: all saleable property belonging to the judgment-debtor is liable to attachment and sale, except the following:
Clause (a): the necessary wearing apparel, cooking vessels, beds and bedding of the judgment-debtor, his wife and children, and such personal ornaments as, by religious usage, cannot be parted with.
Clause (b): tools of artisans and, in the case of agriculturists, implements of husbandry and such cattle and seed-grain as, in the opinion of the Court, are necessary to enable him to earn his livelihood.
Clause (c): houses and other buildings (with the sites and the land immediately appurtenant and necessary for their enjoyment) belonging to an agriculturist, labourer or domestic servant and occupied by him.
Order XXI Rules 30, 54 and 64: money decrees are executed by attachment and sale; Rule 54 deals with attachment of immovable property.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The exemptions are meant to protect the means of livelihood and shelter of the judgment-debtor, and are to be applied according to their terms.
Saleable property which is not within an exemption, such as agricultural land (as distinct from the house), remains attachable, subject to the applicable land laws.
5. Application to the Present Problem
(i) The house in which Mohan, an agriculturist, lives is exempt under clause (c).
(ii) The plough, implements of husbandry and the cattle necessary for his livelihood are exempt under clause (b), the Court deciding what is necessary.
(iii) His wearing apparel and cooking vessels are exempt under clause (a).
(iv) His agricultural land is not within the list, and is therefore liable to attachment and sale in execution.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The house, farming implements and necessary cattle, and wearing apparel and cooking vessels are exempt under Section 60(1)(a), (b) and (c). The decree-holder may attach and sell only Mohan’s agricultural land (and other attachable property).
Ratio Decidendi: Section 60(1) exempts the necessities of life and livelihood of the judgment-debtor, such as the house of an agriculturist, his implements and cattle, and wearing apparel; other saleable property can be attached.
P3A files a suit against B for Rs. 50,000 and, after evidence is led, withdraws it without the Court’s permission. He then files a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Is it maintainable?
Primary Problem: ‘A’ files a suit against ‘B’ for recovery of Rs. 50,000. After the evidence is partly recorded, A withdraws the suit without the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit. A then files a new suit against B on the same cause of action. Can B object?
📝 Practice problem — framed from topics asked in past KSLU papers:
Unit 3 syllabus: Withdrawal and compromise of suits (Order XXIII)
A withdrew his suit against B after evidence had been partly recorded.
He did not obtain the Court’s permission to sue afresh.
He files a new suit on the same cause of action.
2. Issues Involved
Is a plaintiff who withdraws without leave barred from filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Order XXIII Rule 1(1): at any time after the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may abandon the suit or a part of his claim against all or any of the defendants.
Order XXIII Rule 1(3): where the Court is satisfied that the suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or that there are other sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit, it may grant him permission to withdraw with liberty to institute a fresh suit.
Order XXIII Rule 1(4): where the plaintiff withdraws without such permission, he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award, and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The rule prevents a plaintiff from abandoning one suit and starting another, to harass the defendant or to get a second chance. Permission to withdraw with liberty is granted only for a formal defect or other sufficient ground — K.S. Bhoopathy v. Kokila (2000) 5 SCC 458.
The bar in Rule 1(4) is similar to res judicata, and applies to the same subject matter and the same parties.
5. Application to the Present Problem
A withdrew without any permission to sue again, so Rule 1(4) applies and he is precluded from instituting a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter.
The new suit, on the same cause of action against the same party, falls within the bar.
A may also be made to pay costs of the withdrawn suit.
6. Decision / Conclusion
B’s objection is valid. A is precluded by Order XXIII Rule 1(4) from instituting a fresh suit on the same cause of action, and the new suit is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable.
Ratio Decidendi: A plaintiff who withdraws a suit without the Court’s permission to sue afresh is barred from filing a fresh suit on the same subject matter (Order XXIII Rule 1(4)).
Unit 4 — Suits in Particular Cases, Interim Orders and Appeals
3 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1Ramu, a daily-wage labourer with only his hut, tools and clothes, wants to sue for Rs. 2 lakh due as wages but cannot pay the court fee. Advise on the procedure.
Primary Problem: Ramu, a daily-wage labourer, owns nothing but his hut, his tools of work and wearing apparel. He wants to sue the contractor for Rs. 2 lakh due to him as wages, but he cannot afford the court fee payable on the plaint. Advise him on the procedure available.
📝 Practice problem — framed from topics asked in past KSLU papers:
Apr 2021 / Nov 2021: Q.7(a) / Q.8(a) — essay: “State the procedure for instituting a suit by an indigent person.”
Ramu has no property apart from his hut, tools and clothes.
He wants to sue the contractor for Rs. 2 lakh, but cannot pay the court fee.
2. Issues Involved
Can Ramu sue as an indigent person, and what is the procedure?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Order XXXIII Rule 1, C.P.C. (Explanation): a person is “indigent” if he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint, or, where no such fee is prescribed, if he is not entitled to property worth one thousand rupees, other than the property exempt from attachment in execution of a decree and the subject matter of the suit.
Rules 2–3: the application must contain the particulars required for a plaint, a schedule of movable and immovable property with estimated values, and be signed and verified; it is presented in person (unless exempted).
Rules 4–7: the Court examines the applicant, may reject on the grounds in Rule 5, gives notice to the opposite party and to the Government Pleader, and holds an inquiry into his means.
Rules 8–10: if admitted, the application is registered as the plaint and the suit proceeds, and the State recovers the court fee from the party who is ordered to pay costs, or out of the amount recovered.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The object is to ensure that poverty does not bar access to justice. The Court decides indigency on the facts, treating property exempt from attachment (such as tools and wearing apparel, Section 60) as not counting.
The application may be rejected if the applicant is not indigent, has disposed of property to become indigent, has no cause of action, or the claim is barred by law (Rule 5).
5. Application to the Present Problem
Ramu’s hut (a labourer’s house occupied by him is exempt under Section 60), tools and clothes are exempt from attachment, so they are not counted as his means.
He has no other property, so he is an indigent person within the Explanation to Rule 1.
He should file an application with the particulars of a plaint and a schedule of property; the Court will examine him, give notice to the contractor and the Government Pleader, and inquire.
6. Decision / Conclusion
Ramu can sue as an indigent person under Order XXXIII. He should present an application with the required particulars and a schedule of property. If the Court, after inquiry, finds him indigent, it will admit the application as a plaint, and the suit will proceed without payment of court fee, which will be recovered later from the party liable or from the amount decreed.
Ratio Decidendi: A person with no means to pay the court fee may sue as an indigent person under Order XXXIII, subject to the Court’s inquiry; the fee is recovered later from the successful party.
P2Two brothers jointly own a rented building. One collects all rents and refuses to account. The other sues for partition and accounts and asks the Court to protect the rent. What interim relief can he get?
Primary Problem: A and B are brothers and co-owners of a building let out to tenants. A alone collects the rents and refuses to account to B. B files a suit for partition and accounts and applies to the Court for an interim order to protect the rents. What interim relief can B get?
📝 Practice problem — framed from topics asked in past KSLU papers:
Nov 2021: Q.7(a) — essay: “When can the court appoint a receiver? State the powers and duties of a receiver.”
B has sued for partition and accounts, and wants the rent protected.
2. Issues Involved
Can the Court appoint a receiver for the building during the suit?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Order XL Rule 1, C.P.C. and Section 94(d): where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient, the Court may by order appoint a receiver of any property, whether before or after decree, collect rents and profits, and confer on him such powers as it thinks fit.
Order XL Rules 3–4: the receiver’s duties — furnish security, submit accounts, collect rents and pay them as the Court directs; he is liable for loss caused by wilful default or gross negligence.
Order XXXIX Rule 1(a): the Court may also grant a temporary injunction to restrain waste or dealing with the property.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The appointment of a receiver is a harsh remedy and is allowed only where it is just and convenient: where the plaintiff has a prima facie case, the property is in danger of being wasted or misapplied, and there is no other adequate remedy — T. Krishnaswamy Chetty v. C. Thangavelu Chetty (AIR 1955 Mad 430).
Courts appoint receivers in disputes between co-owners or partners where one co-owner is in sole control and misapplies or refuses to account for income.
5. Application to the Present Problem
B has a prima facie case, as a co-owner entitled to a share in the rent, and he has sued for partition and accounts.
A’s refusal to account, and his sole collection of the rents, put the income of the co-owned property at risk of misapplication.
The Court can appoint a receiver to collect the rents and hold them, or deposit them in Court, until the suit is decided. A less drastic order, such as directing A to deposit the rents, can also be made.
6. Decision / Conclusion
B may apply under Order XL Rule 1 for a receiver to collect the rents of the building. As A has excluded B from the rents and refuses to account, the Court will ordinarily consider it just and convenient to appoint a receiver (or direct deposit of the rents), pending the decision of the suit.
Ratio Decidendi: A receiver may be appointed when it is just and convenient to protect property or its income from waste or misapplication pending the suit (Order XL Rule 1).
P3A sues for a declaration of title to a plot and a permanent injunction. During the suit B starts construction on the plot. A wants to stop it. Advise.
Primary Problem: ‘A’ has instituted a suit against ‘B’ for a declaration that he is the owner of a plot, and for a permanent injunction. During the pendency of the suit, B starts constructing a building on the plot. A wants to prevent the construction until the suit is decided. Advise A.
📝 Practice problem — framed from topics asked in past KSLU papers:
Apr 2021: Q.7(b) — short note: “Temporary injunction.”
A’s suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of a plot is pending.
B has started building on the plot during the suit.
2. Issues Involved
Can A obtain a temporary injunction restraining B’s construction, and on what conditions?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Order XXXIX Rule 1, C.P.C.: where the property in dispute is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party, or the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury in relation to the property, the Court may grant a temporary injunction to restrain it until the disposal of the suit.
Order XXXIX Rule 3: the Court must record reasons if it grants an injunction without notice; Rule 3A: the Court shall decide the application within 30 days.
Section 151: the inherent power of the Court.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The Court grants a temporary injunction on three tests: a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury if relief is refused — Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh (1992) 1 SCC 719.
The purpose is to maintain the status quo until the suit is decided, so that the final decree is not rendered fruitless — Wander Ltd v. Antox India (P) Ltd (1990) Supp SCC 727.
5. Application to the Present Problem
A has a prima facie case, if he can show his title or possession by documents.
A building constructed during the suit may cause loss which cannot be reversed. Demolition later is a harsh remedy, so the balance of convenience favours maintaining the status quo.
B will lose nothing by waiting for the decision, whereas A may suffer irreparable injury if the construction changes the character of the plot.
6. Decision / Conclusion
A should apply under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 for a temporary injunction restraining B from constructing on the plot, supported by an affidavit and documents. If the three tests are met, the Court will grant it, and may pass an ex parte order if delay would defeat its purpose.
Ratio Decidendi: A temporary injunction is granted to preserve the property until the suit is decided, on proof of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury (Order XXXIX).
Unit 5 — Limitation Act, 1963
5 problems from past KSLU papers. Click any question to view the full FILAD answer.
P1Right to sue arises to P during his minority. P dies one day after attaining majority. He is succeeded by his son K, who is a minor. Determine the effect on the period of limitation.
Primary Problem: Right to sue arises to ‘P’ during his minority. ‘P’ dies one day after attaining majority. He is succeeded by his son ‘K’ who is a minor. Determine the effect on the period of limitation.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2018: Q.9(c) — this problem (P and K)
Apr 2021: Q.9(b) — same problem with ‘X’ and ‘Y’
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) / 6 (2021 paper) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
The right to sue accrued to P while he was a minor.
P attained majority and died the next day.
His son K, a minor, is his legal representative.
2. Issues Involved
Does P’s minority extend the period of limitation?
Does K’s own minority give a further extension?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 6(1), Limitation Act, 1963: where a person entitled to institute a suit is, at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned, a minor (or insane or an idiot), he may institute the suit within the same period after the disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed.
Section 6(3): where the disability continues up to the death of the person, his legal representative may sue within the same period after the death.
Section 6(4): where the legal representative referred to in sub-section (3) is under a disability at the date of the death, sub-sections (1) and (2) apply to him.
Section 6(5): where a person under disability dies after the disability ceases but within the period allowed to him under the section, his legal representative may institute the suit within the period which would have been allowed to that person had he not died.
Section 8: the benefit of Sections 6 and 7 cannot extend the limitation for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person under disability.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
The disability must exist at the time from which limitation is to be reckoned (that is, when the right accrues). Once time has begun to run, a later disability does not stop it (Section 9).
The legal representative takes the right as it stood in the hands of the deceased. Where the deceased had attained majority before death, Section 6(5) allows the representative only the period which the deceased would himself have had.
Section 6(4), which gives a representative the benefit of his own disability, refers only to the case in sub-section (3), where the disability of the deceased continued until death.
5. Application to the Present Problem
P’s right accrued during his minority, so under Section 6(1), P would have had the full period of limitation after attaining majority.
P died one day after attaining majority. His disability had ceased before death, so Section 6(5) applies, and K, as legal representative, may sue within the period which would have been allowed to P had he not died, that is, the full period of limitation counted from the date P attained majority.
K’s own minority does not give a further extension, because Section 6(4) covers only the case in which the deceased’s disability continued till death. (K, being a minor, would sue through a next friend under Order XXXII.) The three-year outer limit in Section 8 also applies.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The period of limitation runs from the date on which P attained majority, and K may sue within the period which P himself would have had. K’s minority does not extend it further, because P died after his own disability had ceased (Section 6(5)).
Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 6(5), if a person under disability dies after the disability ceases, his legal representative gets only the period the deceased would have had. The representative’s own disability does not extend it.
P2Chetan has taken a loan from Ganesh. Before the expiry of limitation he gives Ganesh an acknowledgment stating, “I owe you Rs. 50,000. But I refuse to pay the same.” Examine the validity of the acknowledgment.
Primary Problem: Chetan has taken a loan from Ganesh. He has given an acknowledgment to Ganesh before the expiry of limitation stating that, “I owe you Rs. 50,000. But I refuse to pay the same.” Examine the validity of the acknowledgment.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2019: Q.9(c) — this problem
Nov 2021: Q.10(a) — essay on the essentials of a valid acknowledgment
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Chetan borrowed money from Ganesh.
Before limitation expired, he gave Ganesh an acknowledgment: “I owe you Rs. 50,000. But I refuse to pay the same.”
2. Issues Involved
Does a statement admitting the debt but refusing to pay amount to a valid acknowledgment under Section 18?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 18(1), Limitation Act, 1963: where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.
Explanation (a) to Section 18: an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for payment has not yet come, or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set-off, or is addressed to a person other than the person entitled.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
An acknowledgment must (i) be in writing and signed, (ii) be made before the limitation period expires, and (iii) admit the existence of a subsisting liability. It need not contain a promise or a willingness to pay — Maniram v. Seth Rupchand (1906) 33 IA 165; Khan Bahadur Shapoor Fredoom Mazda v. Durga Prosad Chamaria (AIR 1961 SC 1236).
The Explanation to Section 18 expressly states that an acknowledgment is not invalid because it is accompanied by a refusal to pay.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Chetan’s statement “I owe you Rs. 50,000” is a clear admission of a subsisting liability.
The addition “but I refuse to pay the same” is a refusal to pay, which, under Explanation (a), does not destroy the acknowledgment.
It was made in writing, before the expiry of limitation (as the problem states), and presumably signed by Chetan.
6. Decision / Conclusion
The acknowledgment is valid. It admits the liability, and the refusal to pay does not affect its validity (Explanation to Section 18). A fresh period of limitation begins to run from the date it was signed.
Ratio Decidendi: An acknowledgment under Section 18 needs only an admission of liability. It is valid even if it is accompanied by a refusal to pay.
P3Gopal took a loan from Rajeev on 10-2-2014 and gave a written acknowledgement on 15-4-2017. Rajeev sued for recovery on 10-8-2017. Is the suit within limitation?
Primary Problem: Gopal has taken a loan from Rajeev on 10-2-2014. He has given a written acknowledgement of loan to Rajeev on 15-4-2017. Rajeev has instituted a suit for recovery of the loan against Gopal on 10-8-2017. Is the suit within limitation?
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Dec 2020: Q.9(c) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Loan taken on 10-2-2014.
Written acknowledgment given on 15-4-2017.
Suit for recovery filed on 10-8-2017.
2. Issues Involved
What is the period of limitation for the suit, and when did it expire?
Does an acknowledgment made after the expiry of the period extend limitation?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Article 19, Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963: for money payable for money lent, the period is three years, from the date when the loan is made.
Section 18(1): an acknowledgment signed in writing before the expiration of the prescribed period gives a fresh period from the date of the acknowledgment.
Section 25(3), Indian Contract Act, 1872: a written and signed promise to pay, wholly or in part, a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law of limitation, is a valid contract without consideration.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
An acknowledgment extends limitation only if it is made before the original period expires. An acknowledgment made after the debt is already time-barred does not revive it under Section 18.
A time-barred debt can be revived only by a fresh written promise to pay it (Section 25(3), Contract Act), and then a suit lies on the promise within its own limitation period.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Assuming the loan was repayable without a fixed date, the three years ran from 10-2-2014 and expired on 10-2-2017.
The acknowledgment was made on 15-4-2017, which is after the expiry of limitation, so Section 18 does not give a fresh period.
The suit filed on 10-8-2017 is more than three years from the date of the loan, and is therefore barred by limitation, unless the document contains an express promise to pay (Section 25(3), Contract Act).
6. Decision / Conclusion
The suit is barred by limitation. The period expired on 10-2-2017, and the acknowledgment of 15-4-2017, made after the expiry, does not extend it under Section 18. Rajeev could succeed only if the writing contains a fresh promise to pay the time-barred debt (Section 25(3), Indian Contract Act).
Ratio Decidendi: An acknowledgment extends limitation only if made before the expiry of the period (Section 18). One made after the debt is time-barred does not revive it.
P4Keshav has been a tenant in Sunil’s house for 35 years. Sunil, who needs the house for his own use, files an eviction petition. Keshav claims he has become owner by adverse possession. Decide.
Primary Problem: Keshav is a tenant in Sunil’s house since last 35 years. Now Sunil wants the house for his own use. He has filed an eviction petition against Keshav. Keshav contends that he has become owner of the house by adverse possession. Decide.
📋 Where this appeared in past KSLU papers:
Jul 2019: Q.9(c) — this problem
Marks: 10 (Q.9 — any two of three) · Method: FILAD (Facts → Issues → Law → Application → Decision)
1. Facts of the Problem
Keshav has been Sunil’s tenant for 35 years.
Sunil wants the house for his own use and has filed an eviction petition.
Keshav claims ownership by adverse possession.
2. Issues Involved
Can a tenant acquire ownership of the tenanted premises by adverse possession?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 27, Limitation Act, 1963: at the determination of the period limited for a suit for possession of any property, the right to such property is extinguished.
Article 65: a suit for possession of immovable property based on title must be filed within twelve years from the date when the defendant’s possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
Section 116, Indian Evidence Act, 1872: a tenant is estopped from denying the title of his landlord at the beginning of the tenancy (the corresponding provision of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 applies to later proceedings).
Section 111(g), Transfer of Property Act, 1882: a lease is determined by forfeiture where the lessee denies the title of the lessor, and the lessor elects to determine the lease.
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Adverse possession requires possession that is open, continuous, exclusive and hostile to the true owner, with an intention to hold as owner (animus possidendi) — T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa (2006) 7 SCC 570; Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India (2004) 10 SCC 779.
The possession of a tenant is permissive. It is derived from, and held on behalf of, the landlord and is therefore not adverse. Time begins to run only when the tenant openly repudiates the landlord’s title and the landlord has notice of the repudiation.
A person claiming adverse possession admits the title of another, and must plead and prove the date from which possession became hostile.
5. Application to the Present Problem
Keshav entered and has held possession for 35 years as a tenant, that is, with the landlord’s permission and under his title. His possession was not hostile at any time.
There is no case that Keshav ever repudiated Sunil’s title or asserted ownership to his knowledge. The length of possession (35 years) is therefore irrelevant.
As a tenant, Keshav is also estopped from denying Sunil’s title (Section 116). Sunil’s claim for eviction on his need for own use is not affected by the plea.
6. Decision / Conclusion
Keshav’s plea of adverse possession fails. A tenant’s possession is permissive and cannot be adverse to his landlord. The eviction petition will be decided on the landlord’s requirement under the applicable rent law, and Keshav cannot claim ownership.
Ratio Decidendi: Possession of a tenant is permissive and cannot be adverse to the landlord; a tenant cannot claim ownership by adverse possession unless he openly repudiates the landlord’s title.
P5The Court is closed on the last date of the limitation period. A seeks extension of the limitation period on that ground. Will he succeed?
Primary Problem: The court is closed on the last date of limitation period. ‘A’ seeks extension of limitation period on that ground. Will he succeed?
The prescribed period of limitation ended on a day on which the Court was closed.
A seeks extension of the period for that reason.
2. Issues Involved
Is a party entitled to the benefit of Section 4 when the Court is closed on the last day?
3. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 4, Limitation Act, 1963: where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the Court reopens.
Section 5: extension of the period on sufficient cause, which applies only to appeals and applications (not suits).
4. Legal Principles & Judicial Rule
Section 4 is not a true extension. It permits the act to be done on the next working day when the Court is closed on the last day of the period. It applies only to the prescribed period, and not to a period computed otherwise, for example, by calculation of excluded time.
The party need not show any cause. It is enough to show that the Court was closed on the last day.
5. Application to the Present Problem
The last day of limitation fell on a day when the Court was closed, so A can file the suit, appeal or application on the next day on which the Court reopens.
No application for condonation of delay is needed, since in law there is no delay.
6. Decision / Conclusion
A will succeed. Under Section 4, he can file on the day the Court reopens, and the filing will be within time. No extension of limitation as such is needed.
Ratio Decidendi: When the Court is closed on the last day of the prescribed period, the proceeding may be filed on the day the Court reopens (Section 4).