Unit I — Nature, Definition, Origin, Basis & Sources of IL; Relationship with Municipal Law
| Citation | The Paquete Habana, United States Supreme Court, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) |
| Facts | During the Spanish-American War, the U.S. Navy seized two unarmed Cuban fishing vessels as prize of war. The owners claimed customary International Law exempted peaceful coastal fishing vessels from capture. |
| Held | The Supreme Court held that a settled customary rule did exempt coastal fishing vessels from capture, and ordered restitution of the vessels and proceeds to the owners. |
| Principle | "International law is part of our law" — Justice Gray's statement is the clearest articulation of the incorporation doctrine: customary International Law automatically forms part of domestic law without any specific legislative act, subject only to being overridden by statute. |
| Citation | North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark/Netherlands), ICJ, 1969 |
| Facts | Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands disputed the delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea. Germany argued the equidistance method in the Geneva Convention did not bind it as a non-party, and was not customary law. |
| Held | The ICJ held that the equidistance rule had not become customary International Law. A treaty provision does not automatically become custom merely because many States are parties to it. |
| Principle | Established the modern two-part test for custom: (1) extensive and virtually uniform State practice, including States whose interests are specially affected; and (2) opinio juris — belief that the practice is legally obligatory. Also held that continental shelf rights exist ipso facto and ab initio. |
| Citation | S.S. Wimbledon Case, Permanent Court of International Justice, 1923 |
| Facts | Germany refused passage of a British-chartered ship through the Kiel Canal during the Russo-Polish War, citing its neutrality obligations, despite the Treaty of Versailles requiring the canal to remain open to all nations. |
| Held | The PCIJ held Germany internationally responsible for breaching its treaty obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. Treaty obligations are genuinely and strictly binding upon States. |
| Principle | Confirmed the binding force of pacta sunt servanda — treaties are not merely aspirational or moral commitments but create strict legal obligations. A State entering a treaty exercises its sovereignty, not surrenders it. |
| Citation | Triquet v. Bath, King's Bench, 1764 |
| Facts | A dispute concerning the privileges of a foreign diplomatic servant under the law of nations arose before an English court. |
| Held | Lord Mansfield affirmed that the law of nations forms part of the law of England and must be applied by English courts. |
| Principle | Established the foundational English principle of the doctrine of incorporation — customary International Law is automatically part of domestic common law without requiring any legislative act. One of the earliest judicial endorsements of this doctrine. |
| Citation | Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria, Court of Appeal (England), 1977 |
| Facts | Trendtex sued the Central Bank of Nigeria in England. The Bank claimed sovereign immunity. The question was whether the modern restrictive doctrine of immunity (limiting immunity for commercial acts) had replaced the older absolute doctrine in English law. |
| Held | Lord Denning held that customary International Law is incorporated into English law automatically and, importantly, that it evolves along with developments in International Law itself. |
| Principle | English courts must apply customary International Law as it currently stands, not as it existed at some earlier fixed point. This modernised the incorporation doctrine, making it dynamic rather than static. |
| Citation | Gramophone Company of India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey, Supreme Court of India, 1984 |
| Facts | The case raised the question of how International Law applies within the Indian domestic legal system, particularly the relationship between customary IL and Indian statutes. |
| Held | The Supreme Court held that domestic law should be interpreted in harmony with International Law, and that customary International Law, if not inconsistent with domestic law, is deemed incorporated into Indian law. |
| Principle | Confirmed incorporation of custom in Indian practice — courts should presume Parliament did not intend to breach International Law when statutes are silent or ambiguous. No specific legislative act is needed for customary rules. |
| Citation | Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, Supreme Court of India, 1980 |
| Facts | A debtor argued that civil imprisonment for debt violated the ICCPR (to which India was a party), which prohibits imprisonment merely for inability to fulfil a contractual obligation. The CPC, however, expressly permitted civil imprisonment for debt. |
| Held | The Supreme Court, per Justice Krishna Iyer, held that the ICCPR could not override the express provisions of the CPC in the absence of implementing legislation. |
| Principle | In India's dualist-oriented system, an unincorporated treaty cannot be directly enforced by domestic courts to override existing statutes — implementing legislation is required (Article 253 of the Constitution). |
Unit II — States as Subjects, Recognition, and Territorial Sovereignty
| Citation | Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ Advisory Opinion, 1949 |
| Facts | UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte was killed in Israel while performing his duties. The question was whether the United Nations could bring an international claim against a State for injuries suffered by its agent. |
| Held | The ICJ held that the UN possesses objective international legal personality, distinct from its member States and opposable even to non-member States. |
| Principle | Foundational authority for the doctrine of implied powers — an international organization possesses not only expressly conferred powers but also those necessarily implied as essential to performing its functions. Established that organizations have derivative, functional personality. |
| Citation | Luther v. Sagor, Court of Appeal (England), 1921 |
| Facts | The plaintiff challenged the validity of a Soviet government decree nationalising his timber business. At first instance, the Soviet government was not recognised by the UK and the decree was held invalid. Before the appeal, the UK granted de facto recognition. |
| Held | The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that upon recognition, the Soviet government's acts — including the nationalisation decree — were valid from the date it actually assumed effective power, not from the date of recognition. |
| Principle | Recognition has retroactive effect — once granted, the recognised government's legislative, judicial, and executive acts are treated as valid from the date it assumed power. Leading authority on the domestic legal consequences of recognition. |
| Citation | Wulfsohn v. R.S.F.S.R., United States Court, 1923 |
| Facts | The unrecognised Soviet Government attempted to maintain a legal action in American courts before the United States formally recognised it in 1933. |
| Held | The court held that the unrecognised Soviet Government could not maintain an action in U.S. courts. |
| Principle | An unrecognised State or government has no locus standi (standing to sue) before the domestic courts of a State that has not recognised it. Recognition is a practical precondition for access to another State's judicial system. |
| Citation | Government of the Republic of Spain v. SS Arantzazu Mendi, House of Lords, 1939 |
| Facts | Both the Republican Government and the Nationalist Government of Spain claimed ownership of a Spanish vessel in a British port. The question was whether the recognised Nationalist government could claim sovereign immunity. |
| Held | The House of Lords held that a recognised foreign government and its property enjoy sovereign immunity from suit before domestic courts. |
| Principle | A key domestic legal effect of recognition: a recognised foreign State enjoys sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of the recognising State's courts, protecting its property and governmental acts from judicial challenge. |
| Citation | Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1928 |
| Facts | The Netherlands and the USA both claimed sovereignty over the Island of Palmas (Miangas). The USA relied on Spain's original discovery and its cession by Spain under the Treaty of Paris (1898). The Netherlands relied on its continuous and peaceful administration of the island. |
| Held | Arbitrator Max Huber awarded sovereignty to the Netherlands, holding that mere discovery confers only an inchoate title that must be perfected through continuous display of State authority. |
| Principle | Discovery alone is insufficient for territorial sovereignty — it creates only an inchoate title which must be perfected within a reasonable time by effective and continuous display of State authority. The leading authority on occupation as a mode of territorial acquisition. |
| Citation | Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), PCIJ, 1933 |
| Facts | Norway proclaimed sovereignty over parts of Eastern Greenland. Denmark claimed sovereignty over the entire island based on its long-standing, though limited, exercise of authority over the sparsely inhabited territory. |
| Held | The PCIJ upheld Denmark's sovereignty, holding that for sparsely inhabited or remote territory, only a minimal but continuous display of State authority is required. |
| Principle | The standard for effective occupation is proportionate to the territory's nature — remote, uninhabited, or sparsely populated areas require only minimal (but continuous) acts of sovereignty. Complements and qualifies the Island of Palmas standard. |
| Citation | Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), ICJ, 1962 |
| Facts | A French-drawn map (Annex I) placed the ancient Temple of Preah Vihear within Cambodian territory, deviating from the treaty's watershed line. Thailand received copies but did not formally object for several decades, and even relied upon the map in official contexts. |
| Held | The ICJ held that Thailand, through prolonged silence and acceptance, was precluded from later denying the map's boundary line. Cambodia possessed sovereignty over the Temple. |
| Principle | Leading authority on acquiescence and estoppel in territorial disputes — a State's prolonged silence and conduct consistent with acceptance of a boundary, especially where the other party has relied on it, bars the silent State from later challenging that boundary. |
| Citation | Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), ICJ, 1986 |
| Facts | Nicaragua sued the USA for supporting the Contra rebels, mining Nicaraguan harbours, and conducting other paramilitary activities against the Nicaraguan government. |
| Held | The ICJ held the USA violated the principle of non-intervention (a rule of customary International Law) and the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. |
| Principle | Two elements of prohibited intervention: (1) it must bear on matters a State may decide freely (political system, foreign policy); (2) it must be coercive in nature. Coercion is the essence of unlawful intervention, distinguishing it from lawful diplomacy or persuasion. |
Unit III — State Jurisdiction (Law of the Sea), State Responsibility, and Succession
| Citation | S.S. Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), Permanent Court of International Justice, 1927 |
| Facts | A collision on the high seas between the French steamship Lotus and a Turkish vessel killed Turkish nationals. Turkey prosecuted the French officer on watch. France objected, arguing Turkey had no jurisdiction over a French national for an act on a French-flagged vessel. |
| Held | The PCIJ held Turkey had not acted contrary to International Law. In the absence of a specific rule prohibiting it, a State remains free to exercise jurisdiction. Turkey could exercise jurisdiction under the objective territorial principle (effects felt aboard a Turkish vessel). |
| Principle | The "Lotus principle": a sovereign State may act as it pleases unless there exists a specific rule of International Law prohibiting it — restrictions on sovereignty cannot be presumed and must be affirmatively established. Later reversed for collision cases specifically by UNCLOS Art. 97. |
| Citation | Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), ICJ, 1951 |
| Facts | Norway drew straight baselines connecting the outermost points of its deeply indented coastline (skjaergaard) to delimit its territorial sea. The UK, whose fishing vessels operated in these waters, challenged this method as contrary to International Law. |
| Held | The ICJ upheld Norway's straight baseline method, holding it valid for States with deeply indented coastlines or fringing islands. The baseline must not depart appreciably from the general direction of the coast. |
| Principle | Established and legitimised the straight baseline method as a valid means of delimiting the territorial sea, later codified in Article 7 of UNCLOS, 1982. Also recognised that economic interests peculiar to a region, evidenced by long usage, may be considered. |
| Citation | Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), ICJ, 1974 |
| Facts | Iceland unilaterally extended its exclusive fishery zone to 50 nautical miles. The UK challenged this extension as contrary to International Law, as the accepted limit was 12 nautical miles at the time. |
| Held | The ICJ recognised the growing acceptance in State practice of extended fishery zones beyond the traditional territorial sea, reflecting an emerging customary trend. |
| Principle | Foreshadowed the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime later formalised by UNCLOS in 1982. Recognised the emerging customary right of coastal States to exercise preferential fishing rights in adjacent waters, balanced against other States' traditional rights. |
| Citation | Youmans Claim (United States v. Mexico), General Claims Commission (United States–Mexico), 1926 |
| Facts | Three Americans in Mexico were besieged by a hostile mob. Mexican troops sent to protect them instead joined the mob and killed them. Mexico argued its soldiers had acted outside the scope of their orders. |
| Held | The Commission held Mexico internationally responsible. A State is responsible for wrongful acts of its military personnel even where those acts exceed their authority or contravene express instructions. |
| Principle | A State cannot escape international responsibility by showing its agents acted ultra vires (beyond authority) or contrary to orders. Responsibility attaches so long as agents were acting under the general cover of their official governmental capacity using the means that capacity gave them. |
| Citation | Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, Permanent Court of International Justice, 1924 |
| Facts | A Greek national (Mavrommatis) held concessions in Palestine that were affected by British mandate policies. Greece took up the claim on his behalf before the PCIJ. |
| Held | The PCIJ accepted jurisdiction and established the foundational principle that when a State takes up a case on behalf of its national, it is asserting its own right under International Law. |
| Principle | Diplomatic protection is a right of the State, not of the individual. When a State espouses its national's claim, it is vindicating its own right to ensure respect for International Law in the person of its subjects. This undermines Calvo Clauses, since an individual cannot waive the State's right. |
| Citation | Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ, 1970 |
| Facts | Belgium sought to exercise diplomatic protection for Belgian shareholders of a Canadian-incorporated company whose assets were harmed by Spanish actions. Canada (the company's State of nationality) did not bring the claim. |
| Held | The ICJ held Belgium's claim inadmissible. Only the State of the company's nationality (Canada), not the shareholders' State, could bring the diplomatic protection claim. |
| Principle | Diplomatic protection of a company belongs to the State of incorporation, not the States of the shareholders' nationality. Confirmed that diplomatic protection remains a discretionary right of the State, reinforcing the traditional position on individuals as objects of International Law. |
Unit IV — State and Individual, Diplomatic Envoys/Consuls, and Treaties
| Citation | Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), ICJ, 1955 |
| Facts | German-born Nottebohm had lived and conducted business in Guatemala for years. Shortly before WWII, he obtained Liechtenstein nationality through brief naturalisation with no genuine ties. Guatemala seized his property as enemy property. Liechtenstein sought to exercise diplomatic protection. |
| Held | The ICJ held Liechtenstein's claim inadmissible. Nationality for diplomatic protection requires a genuine and effective link — habitual residence, centre of interests, family ties, and attachment. |
| Principle | The "genuine link" doctrine: while a State may freely confer nationality under domestic law, that nationality is not opposable to other States for international protection purposes unless it reflects a real and substantial connection between the individual and the granting State. |
| Citation | Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), ICJ, 1950 |
| Facts | After an unsuccessful military rebellion in Peru, Haya de la Torre was granted diplomatic asylum by Colombia within its embassy in Lima. Colombia claimed a regional Latin American custom allowing it to unilaterally qualify the offence as political and demand safe conduct. |
| Held | The ICJ held Colombia failed to prove a binding regional custom. A party relying on regional custom must demonstrate constancy and uniformity of practice, accepted as law — Colombia could not show this. |
| Principle | Two key points: (1) Regional custom requires the same rigorous proof as general custom — constant and uniform practice accepted as law; (2) Diplomatic asylum is not a right under general customary International Law — it exists only through specific treaty or genuinely proven regional custom. |
| Citation | LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States), ICJ, 2001 |
| Facts | Two German nationals (the LaGrand brothers) were arrested, tried, and sentenced to death in Arizona without being informed of their right to consular notification under Article 36 VCCR. Germany was not notified until years later. |
| Held | The ICJ held the USA internationally responsible for violating its obligations under Art. 36 VCCR. The right to consular access creates individual rights for detained foreign nationals, not just inter-State obligations. |
| Principle | Article 36 VCCR creates individual rights for detained foreign nationals — the right to be informed "without delay" of their right to contact their consulate. Breach of this obligation engages State responsibility and requires review and reconsideration of the conviction. |
| Citation | Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), ICJ, 2004 |
| Facts | Mexico brought a claim on behalf of 52 Mexican nationals sentenced to death in various U.S. states without being notified of their right to consular assistance under Article 36 VCCR. |
| Held | The ICJ again held the USA responsible, requiring review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences through the judicial process, not executive clemency alone. |
| Principle | Reinforced LaGrand: consular notification under Art. 36 VCCR is a binding international obligation. The appropriate remedy for breach is judicial review and reconsideration — not clemency — to determine whether the violation caused actual prejudice to the accused. |